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Abstract 
Racial profiling by the police on the nation’s streets and highways has attracted much 
attention over the past two decades from scholars, media figures, politicians and police 
administrators. Several highly publicized cases propelled the issue into national consciousness in 
the early and mid 1990s, bringing a new public awareness to an undoubtedly old problem. 
Despite the proliferation of research and political attention, many questions remain unanswered. 
Among the most common criticisms facing racial profiling research today is the literature's lack 
of theoretical development. Grounded in focal concerns theory and the concept of symbolic 
assailants, the present research draws upon both crime control and discriminatory frameworks of 
racial disparity in traffic stop outcomes. The findings suggest that, while police concerns of 
crime and safety diminish the effect of race/ethnicity and gender on stop outcomes, race and 
gender remain important predictors of police decisions. The implications are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION  
 Racial profiling by police on the nation’s streets and highways has attracted significant 
attention over the past two decades from scholars, media figures, politicians and police 
administrators. Several highly publicized cases propelled the issue into national consciousness in 
the early and mid 1990s, bringing a new public awareness to an old problem. Yet while racial 
controversy was not new to policing, profiling has become one of "the most important issues 
facing American policing" today (Withrow 2006:4).  
 The Emergence of Racial Profiling 
 The term "emergence" is a bit of a misnomer here. Race has arguably always been a 
relevant factor in American criminal justice. That said, racial profiling and driving while 
black/brown are phrases that carry particular meanings embedded in unique historical, social, 
cultural and political contexts. Driving while black first became news at a time of unprecedented 
drug enforcement, moral (and racialized) panic over the so-called crack epidemic, increasing 
violent crime rates, and rapid growth in criminal justice institutions. 
 Although the terms 'driving-while-black' and 'racial profiling' themselves are relatively 
new, profiling practices have been around for decades. Some of the earliest profiles used by law 
enforcement agencies were hijacker profiles; others included serial killer, drug courier, and 
terrorist profiles (Harris 2002)—each of these can be collapsed into the more general category of 
criminal profiling (Harcourt 2004). The fundamental characteristics of these "profiles" are that 
they all emphasize behavioral, situational, and environmental traits that, when considered in 
context, are believed to increase the likelihood that some individual or group is involved in 
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(specific) criminal activity. Racial profiling is different. Racial profiling is unique among other 
criminal profiles because the primary indicator of suspicion, race/ethnicity, is non-behavioral 
specific (Harcourt 2007). The sociological implications are clear: when used as a decisive 
indicator of criminal behavior, racial profiling as both practice and policy is subject to enduring 
stereotypes about race and criminality.  
 Racial profiling, as it is commonly known today, may have first received media attention 
in 1985 when the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) explicitly included race and ethnicity as an 
indicator of illicit drug activity in their agency's drug courier profile (Thistlethwait and 
Wooldredge 2010). The FHP drug courier profile was designed to aggressively target drivers 
suspected of drug trafficking along major interstate highways en route to and from 'source cities' 
(i.e., cities that are known for illicit drug production and trafficking). Because drug trafficking 
was believed to be disproportionately committed by racial/ethnic minorities, the FHP justified 
racial profiling as rational and efficient police work in an effort to control crime (Withrow 2006).  
 Many police agencies across the U.S. adopted similar policies, particularly in cities the 
along east coast in Maryland, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and developed their own drug 
courier profiles in which race/ethnicity was included as a major indicator of suspicion (Harris 
2007). Soon, anecdotal accounts of discrimination emerged as minority drivers alleged they were 
the victims of unfair treatment by the police on the basis of race (Harris 1997). As news of these 
practices spread, the phenomenon was labeled "driving-while-black." The term has since become 
embedded in the American lexicon and is now a common phrase, almost cliché.  
 Public backlash and political reaction to accusations of racial profiling quickly shifted the 
national discussion. Few police agencies today prescribe the overt use of racial profiling to fight 
crime—even drug crime—and many states have passed anti-racial profiling laws prohibiting the 
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practice (Gabbidon, Marzette and Peterson 2007). Three Presidents of the United States have 
publicly spoken out against racial profiling, including Presidents George W. Bush, Bill Clinton 
and Barack Obama. Despite the apparent consensus on the moral harms of racial profiling, the 
public still believes the practice is relatively common and it continues to be perceived as a major 
problem in American law enforcement (Withrow 2006).  
 The analysis of racial profiling should be viewed as an extension of the much more 
established body of literature on police discretion and the debate between crime control and 
discrimination in officer decision making. While racial profiling emerged as a special problem of 
the war on drugs in the 1980s and 90s, concerns about racism in police practices have been 
studied and written about for much longer.  The insights of previous research on police discretion 
and officer decision making should inform today's racial profiling analysis, especially as it 
relates to police decision making that occurs after a traffic stop is already made. Much of the 
extant racial profiling literature, however, has not taken full advantage of this theoretical and 
empirical work (Engel and Calnon 2004; Withrow 2006). 
 One of the difficulties of studying racial profiling is that there is no universal consensus 
on its definition in the literature. Some argue that the term should be used only in reference to the 
phenomenon of racial and ethnic minorities being stopped by police in disproportionate numbers 
compared to whites. Others argue the term should include differential treatment of racial and 
ethnic minorities at  any point in any police-citizen encounter, including enforcement actions 
after a stop is initiated.  Others dismiss the term altogether in favor of terms such as racially-
biased policing (which may also be more vague). For this dissertation, I use a somewhat broader 
variation on the first example to include the extralegal effect of race and ethnicity (and 
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intersections of race and gender) on police decisions to initiate and resolve traffic stops, 
including decisions to stop, warn, cite, search and arrest. 
 The Traffic Stop 
 Despite apparent similarities, there has been a disconnect between research on police 
discretion/decision making, dating as far back as the 1940s and 1950s, and the more recent body 
work on racial profiling in traffic stops (Withrow 2006). One reason for this disjuncture is the 
unique nature of the traffic stop.  Early research on police decision making was primarily 
concerned with police behavior after an encounter had already been initiated. In other words, this 
work was concerned with what officers did after they made a police stop or otherwise engaged 
the public. In contrast, most of the early research on racial profiling in the late 1990s was 
concerned with officer decisions before the citizen encounter even took place—that is, in the 
decision to make the traffic stop.  Racial profiling began as an analysis of the role race played 
prior to as opposed to after the stop.  
 This is an important distinction. For one, the precise influence of a driver's skin color on 
officer decisions to initiate a traffic stop is both difficult to conceptualize and to empirically 
measure. For many, particularly in the courts, the motivation of the officer is the key operative in 
questions of racial profiling: did the officer have racist motivations for making the stop? An 
officer's internal motivation, however, is an elusive thing (Banks 2003). Except under the rare 
circumstance where an officer confesses, "I stopped this driver because of her race," which is 
highly doubtful in a political environment obsessed with colorblindness (Brewer and Heitzeg 
2008), researchers, law makers, administrators, and even the courts cannot easily ascertain the 
officer's intent (Harris 2002). Likewise, neither can officer intent be easily gleaned from an 
official police report. In most cases, expressed or implied motivation is likely assumed to be the 
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legal cause for making the stop (e.g., speeding)—which, in the case of traffic stops, officers can 
easily articulate. Practical and methodological issues aside, the courts have made identifying 
officer motivation problematic in the law as well. For example, in Whren v. United States (1996), 
the U.S. Supreme Court set a precedent that ostensibly eliminated officer motivation—racist or 
otherwise—as a relevant factor in court decisions regarding the constitutionality of a traffic stop 
under the 4th Amendment (more on this will be discussed in Chapter 2). 
 Rethinking Traffic Stops 
 Some of the more recent empirical work on traffic stops has analyzed the effect of legal 
and extralegal factors on discrete traffic stop outcomes (Engel and Calnon 2004; Lundman 
2004). Such outcomes include decisions to issue citations, conduct searches, use force, and make 
arrests.  One limitation in such work is that traffic stop outcomes are not necessarily discrete; 
multiple outcomes are possible in any given stop.  For example, a driver stopped by the police 
may receive a traffic citation, but they could also be searched and arrested during the same stop.  
Another driver may be searched, but not arrested, another ticketed and handcuffed, etc. 
Rethinking traffic stop outcomes as a complex set of discrete and non-discrete possibilities 
should lead to more appropriate measurements that more closely resemble stops as they actually 
occur 'on the ground.' Analyzing stops outcomes in such a way should also facilitate more valid 
estimates of the important factors that affect police decisions. Previous empirical work has not 
yet fully explored the overlapping, non-discrete nature of traffic stop outcomes and the role that 
race/ethnicity plays in predicting them. 
 Racial profiling research has also been criticized for being largely atheoretical (Engel 
2002; Tillyer and Hartley 2010). There have been few attempts to ground analysis of racial 
profiling in conceptual frameworks that offer deeper understanding of racial differences or how 
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other, legally relevant factors also play a part in these outcomes. I use a conceptual framework 
drawing on focal concerns theory (Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer 1998) and the notion of 
symbolic assailants (Skolnick 1966) to construct hypotheses and guide my analysis. Focal 
concerns theory emphasizes the importance of crime control and safety as embodied in the 
concepts of blameworthiness and dangerousness. Symbolic assailants emphasize the racialization 
of police perceptions of violence and danger. Together, these two theories offer a compelling 
explanatory framework for predicting officer decision making. 
 In addition to an explicit theoretical framework and a rethinking of stop outcomes, I also 
explore the intersectionality of race and gender. Racial profiling has been understood in the 
literature primarily as biased policing against minority drivers and citizens. Other driver 
characteristics are often included in the analyses, but characteristics such as race, gender, class 
and age are typically framed as distinct variables, wholly separate from one another and 
independent in their effects on police decisions to enforce the law. Intersectionality theory 
understands race, class and gender not as distinct things, but as interlocking analytical categories 
that simultaneously shape social relations. To explore the intersectional nature of race and gender 
in a racial profiling context, I combine driver's race and sex for six different race-sex interaction 
terms. In doing so, I first run analysis on traffic stops with race and sex as separate variables, 
then run a second identical analysis again with these race and sex combined. 
 In sum, this dissertation attempts to make the following contributions to the literature: a) 
provide an explicit theoretical framework grounded in focal concerns theory and the concept of 
symbolic assailants; b) account for the complexity of non-discrete, multiple and overlapping stop 
outcomes; c) explore the pretext hypothesis by analyzing the role of race and ethnicity on 
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discretionary traffic stops; and d) further explore the intersectionality of race and gender in 
traffic stops and traffic stop outcomes. 
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Chapter 2 - Racial Profiling and the Law 
 Racial profiling and the law are intimately connected to one another. This chapter briefly 
reviews that connection. I focus on two basic questions. First, can race (legally) factor into police 
decision making? More specifically, can citizen race and ethnicity be used by the police to 
articulate reasonable suspicion or probable cause? Second, if police use race in an 
illegal/unconstitutional way, what challenges or remedies are available in the law to the victims 
of this unconstitutional racial targeting? I frame these questions in terms of race and reasonable 
suspicion/probable cause as interpreted in the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and race 
and equal protection of the law as interpreted in the 14th Amendment. A number key court cases 
over the last several decades have set important precedents related to these questions. The cases I 
outline below are by no means not an exhaustive list of jurisprudence on the complex questions 
of race and policing, but they are cases which have served as significant landmarks for future 
court decisions nevertheless.  
 It is important to recognize here that the legal system has undergone a major 
paradigmatic shift over the last half century with regards to identity politics and race. In response 
to civil rights challenges in the 1950s and 1960s and changing public attitudes towards race and 
ethnicity more generally, the language of the law in various forms has shifted from blatant 
racism to (more or less) racial neutrality today. This colorblind shift has brought with it new 
questions and unique problems for  the analysis of race in criminal justice.  
 The central dilemma of the race question in the contemporary legal system is making 
sense of persistent, and in some cases growing, racial inequality—from housing and employment 
to sentencing and incarceration—despite formal neutrality of the law (Balbus 1977). In response 
to this dilemma, some contemporary scholars  have been quick to  make a distinction between 
9 
 
discrimination and disparity (Smith and Alpert 2002). Disparity of outcomes, so the argument 
goes, does not in-and-of itself prove discrimination. For example, if black drivers are stopped 
more frequently than white drivers, is that disparity due to discriminatory policing, differential 
driving habits between white drivers and black drivers, or something else? Disparity alone does 
not give us a conclusive answer. To answer the question we need to rule out alternative 
explanations. This distinction between disparity and discrimination has become a critical point of 
debate in the ongoing racial profiling discussion. In Chapter 3 I will look at how the question has 
been addressed in empirical and theoretical research, but first I examine how the dilemma has 
been framed in the law.  
 Race and Reasonable Suspicion/Probable Cause 
 It seems to follow from a colorblind logic that race should play no role in law 
enforcement. The explicit use of race is explicitly prohibited in a colorblind system. But is this 
really the case? Has the overt use of race been completely eliminated from criminal law and 
procedure, or are there exceptions to the colorblind maxim that allow race to openly factor in law 
enforcement decisions still today? For example, can officers ever use extralegal factors that, 
among other things, include race to articulate reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop, 
cite, search, arrest, or seize? In short, the courts have consistently ruled that race can, legally, be 
considered by the police; the catch is that race cannot be the only factor influencing these 
decisions. In other words, if race is one factor among many used by the police to justify a stop or 
search, then the Supreme Court has said its use is acceptable. 
 The 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides one of the primary safeguards 
against what the original framers believed to be an overly intrusive system of government: the 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The 4th Amendment reads: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
But how, or where, does the practice of racial profiling on roads and highways fit in the 4th 
Amendment? Modern day traffic enforcement was obviously not on the minds of the framers 
when they wrote the amendments. As such, much of the operative language in the 4th 
Amendment is ambiguous towards traffic stops. For example, are vehicles included among 
"persons, houses, papers, and effects" and therefore subject to the 4th Amendment's protections? 
Are warrants necessary in a vehicle search? What is an unreasonable search and seizure in a 
traffic stop compared to other forms of police-public contact (e.g., a pedestrian stop or serving a 
warrant at a residence)? What constitutes probable cause? Can race count towards reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause? Jurisprudence on some of these questions dates back more than one 
hundred years (Samaha 2005). 
 The Supreme Court established in the 1920s what is now commonly referred to as the 
vehicle exception to the 4th Amendment (U.S. v. Carroll, 1925). According to the facts of the 
case, George Carroll and John Kiro were arrested and later convicted in U.S. District Court for 
transporting 68 quarts of whisky/gin in an automobile during the time of national alcohol 
prohibition in U.S. history. Carroll challenged the arrest on the grounds that the officers searched 
his vehicle without a search warrant. The Constitutional question at stake was whether police 
could search an automobile without a search warrant but with probable cause that illegal 
contraband was contained therein. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court agreed that a warrantless 
search of a vehicle does not violate the 4th Amendment if the search is based upon probable 
cause. In their reasoning, the Court recognized a "necessary difference" between immoveable 
structures (e.g., houses, office buildings, businesses) and moveable vehicles, citing the practical 
11 
 
realities of policing automobiles—such as the likelihood that evidence will be put out of officers' 
reach should they have to leave to get a warrant signed by a judge.   
 While on its face the Carroll decision was about the practical constraints of policing 
mobile vehicles, the case did not exist in a social vacuum. The time of national alcohol 
prohibition was a significant socio-political context that no doubt shaped the outcome of the case 
and its implications for the future. The decision marked one of the first steps the Court took to 
broadening police powers significantly in the fight against illicit chemical substances—a prelude 
to the war on drugs. In this sense, the Carroll decision foreshadowed the Court's interpretation of 
constitutional protections in the context of an expansive drug war to follow some fifty years 
later.  
 Though Carroll v. United States expanded police powers to search drivers in traffic stops, 
the more direct questions of race, profiles and probable cause and reasonable suspicion were not 
directly addressed until much later in history. In a criminal profile, such as drug courier profiles 
of the 1980s, there are many indicators included that, when considered as a whole by a trained 
and experienced officer, are supposed to signal the presence of criminal behavior (Harcourt 
2007). But what kinds of indicators can be included lawfully? Can extralegal factors like a 
person's sex, age, race, or socioeconomic status  be considered? When do common, extralegal 
and otherwise non-suspicious characteristics amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
and in turn legally justify a stop, search or arrest? The U.S. Supreme Court addressed some of 
these questions in U.S. v. Sokolow (1989) when the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
search and seizure in which an officer relied on a drug courier profile consisting of a set of 
extralegal factors.  
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 Andrew Sokolow was convicted in a U.S. District Court for possession of cocaine with 
the intent to distribute. DEA agents became suspicious of Sokolow in the Honolulu airport when 
he matched a set of indicators consistent with their drug courier profile: paying more than $2000 
in cash for two roundtrip tickets to Miami, unchecked luggage, nervous demeanor, gold jewelry, 
and traveling under an alias. Although race was not explicitly mentioned by the law enforcement 
agents as an important indicator in their profile, the case's significance lies in the precedent of the 
Court allowing a law enforcement agency's use of a drug courier profile to selectively target 
suspects.  
 Like alcohol prohibition in Carroll v. U.S., the context of a national drug panic proved to 
be a significant social and political backdrop to the Sokolow case. After an appeal, the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of its serious implications for the enforcement of 
federal narcotics laws." The Court upheld the constitutionality of reasonable suspicion based on 
the series of extralegal indicators identified by the DEA. In doing so, the Court implicitly 
condoned the use of drug courier profiles—and while not openly mentioned in Sokolow, race was 
explicitly included in many drug courier profiles of the time (Covington 2001; Harris 2002).  
 Despite upholding the use of extralegal factors to form probable cause in Sokolow, the 
Court recognized the potentially serious implications of these profiles as it relates to 
discrimination, even if it remained fairly ambiguous toward the matter. Early defenders of drug 
courier profiles often argued that what may seem unsuspicious to the untrained eye can amount 
to reasonable suspicion when observed by an experienced and trained law enforcement officer 
(MacDonald 2003). In other words, some argue that profiles are just good police work. 
Opponents of profiles, on the other hand, argue that the indicators cited by law enforcement are 
vague, contradictory, susceptible to  racial and ethnic stereotypes, and encourage the abuse of 
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officer discretion. In a dissenting opinion, for example, Justices Marshall and Brennan said that it 
is "highly significant that the DEA agents stopped Sokolow because he matched one of the 
DEA's 'profiles' of a paradigmatic drug courier" and they warned against the "mechanistic 
application of a formula" that is inherent in the use of these types of profiles.  
 A U.S. Court of Appeals took on a more direct question of race and reasonable suspicion 
in U.S. v. Weaver (1992).  Arthur Weaver was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. An officer became suspicious of Weaver in the Kansas City International Airport 
"because he was a 'roughly dressed' young black male who was carrying two bags and walking 
rapidly… down the concourse toward a door leading to a taxi stand." The officer confronted 
Weaver in the airport and, when Weaver attempted to leave, the officer followed him to a taxi. 
Weaver was arrested when he refused to let  the officer seize his bags. The central constitutional 
question was whether the officer had valid reasonable suspicion to pursue, stop, and ultimately 
conduct the warrantless search and seizure. More specifically, could the officer articulate 
reasonable suspicion based on the fact that Weaver was a "roughly dressed" black man arriving 
in Kansas City from Los Angeles, a known source city for illegal drugs? The court ruled in favor 
of the arresting officer, asserting that the totality of Weaver's race, "rough" clothing, and "rapid" 
movement from the airplane to the taxi stand justifiably led the arresting officer to believe he 
was a member of an "all-black Los Angeles street gang" bringing illegal narcotics into the 
Kansas City area.  
 The precedent set in Weaver was significant because race was not a coincidental or 
implicit factor in the case; Weaver's race was explicitly articulated as a deciding factor in the 
officer's decision to pursue, stop and search. In a dissenting opinion, judge CJ Arnold raised 
concerns about the implications of the court's decision. He argued that not only was "roughly 
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dressed" a vague and subjective indicator, but that there was no empirical evidence offered to the 
court by the State that showed that blacks were more likely to be drug users or couriers (the very 
basic assumption underlying most drug courier profiles of the time). Judge Arnold argued that to 
use the suspect's race as a decisive factor for reasonable suspicion "reinforces the kind of 
stereotyping that lies behind drug-courier profiles"—that is, the widespread belief that minorities, 
blacks in particular, are disproportionately involved in illicit drug use and distribution. 
 Interestingly, the court's majority admitted that "some or all of the facts relied upon by 
Agent Hicks [the arresting officer] could… when viewed by those having no experience in 
surveilling and apprehending drug couriers, be viewed as innocent, nonsuspicion-raising details." 
Unfortunately there is no way to know how many other similarly situated passengers/travelers 
Agent Hicks or other officers in the department stopped and searched in similar circumstances. 
Nor can we know the race and demeanor of said suspects, innocent or otherwise, which could 
bolster or refute the officer's claims. We, like the court, are left to take the officer's word for it. 
 Each of these cases set important precedents that ultimately helped shape the legal and 
judicial backdrop to racial profiling today. Carroll loosened the constitutional protections 
guaranteed by the 4th Amendment in vehicles and both Weaver and Sokolow blurred the 
boundaries between legal and extralegal factors under the 4th Amendment. The following case 
not only further expanded police powers (especially in traffic stops), but proved to be a major 
roadblock in terms of challenging the reasonableness and constitutionality of a search and 
seizure based on racial bias under the 4th Amendment (Alexander 2010). 
 Race and Pretext 
 Traffic stops for minor, routine infractions may lead to the discovery of more serious 
crimes, including things like illegal weapons, drugs, paraphernalia, or outstanding arrest 
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warrants. The police sometimes use stops for the deliberate purpose of discovery (Harris 2002). 
A particularly contentious form of this practice is the use of routine traffic infractions as a pretext 
to stop and investigate for other crime—better known as fishing expeditions. For example, in a 
pretextual stop an officer will stop a driver for a minor traffic violation (e.g., a broken taillight) 
because they suspect the occupant is carrying illegal narcotics. In other words, the officer's 
intention for making the stop does not match the legal justification for the stop. Described by 
some as a constitutional loophole and a tool of discriminatory policing (see Harris 2002), the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of pretextual stops in Whren v. United States (1996).  
 In 1993, Michael A. Whren and James L. Brown became suspicious to plainclothes vice 
officers patrolling in an unmarked car. The officers witnessed Whren and Brown stopped at an 
intersection in their truck for an "unusually long time" (more than 20 seconds according to the 
officers). After the officers did a quick U-turn coming back to the truck, Whren and Brown made 
a right turn (without signaling) and sped off at what the officers described as an "unreasonable" 
speed. The officers soon stopped Whren and Brown when they came to an intersection with a red 
light. After the officers had Whren and Brown stopped, one of the officers approached the 
vehicle and saw what he believed to be two plastic bags of crack cocaine in Whren's hands. The 
officers then searched the vehicle and arrested Whren and Brown upon finding illicit drugs.  
 Whren and Brown appealed their conviction on the basis that the officers did not have 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop and search their vehicle for illicit drugs. They 
argued that the officers used minor traffic violations (i.e., right turn without signaling and 
driving off at an unreasonable speed) as a pretext to investigate for drugs. Whren and Brown 
further argued no reasonable officer, under the same conditions, would have conducted an 
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investigatory stop for illicit drugs based on minor traffic infractions. Both the Court of Appeals 
and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Whren and Brown's argument. 
 In getting to heart of the matter—the allegation that the officers were discriminating 
against Whren and Brown because of what they looked like, not because they broke any (drug) 
law known to the officers at the time of the stop—the Supreme Court argued that the "subjective 
intentions [of officers] play no role in ordinary, probable cause 4th Amendment analysis." Whren 
and Brown's argument rested on the notion that because no reasonable officers would have made 
the initial stop without probable cause to believe they were in possession of illicit drugs, the stop 
violated the 4th Amendment. The Court rejected Whren's 'would have' 4th Amendment test in 
favor of a 'could have' test. The Court reasoned that if an officer could have made the stop based 
on probable cause that a law had been violated—however minor that violation may be, traffic 
infractions included—then the stop is valid and does not violate the 4th Amendment. 
Furthermore, any subsequent search and seizure made in such a stop is not invalidated just 
because the stop was based on a pretext—assuming no other constitutional violations occurred in 
carrying out that search and seizure. Although the practice of using a technical violation of the 
law as a pretext for a stop was not new to policing before Whren (see Tiffany et. al 1967 and 
Wilson v. Township 1993), any constitutional ambiguity about the practice was settled after the 
landmark decision.  
 The broader implications of Whren are two-pronged. First, the Court rejected Whren's 
claims of discrimination on the basis that the subjective intentions of officers are not applicable 
to 4th Amendment scrutiny. As long as an officer has a bona fide legal reason to justify the stop, 
it does not matter if the officer did so with ulterior motives, racist or otherwise—at least not 
under the 4th Amendment. In the majority opinion, the Court said that the "constitutional basis 
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for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, 
not the 4th Amendment." The equal protection clause is contained within the 14th Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. The Court's reasoning effectively shut down racial profiling 
discrimination challenges under the 4th Amendment (Withrow 2006).  
 Second, the expansive nature of traffic codes regulating driving behaviors make the 
'could have' test of Whren particularly heavy-handed from a civil liberties point of view. Given 
the complicated and extensive nature of traffic laws, any simple drive around the block will 
likely result in the violation of some technical traffic law(s). Traffic codes therefore represent a 
unique category of law because violations are both ubiquitous and also easily observed by 
officers (should they choose to look for it). When routine traffic infractions constitute probable 
cause to make an investigative stop, officers have virtually unlimited authority to stop anyone, 
anytime, for any reason at all. In a 1967 interview, one officer put it this way:  
 You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him for a while, 
and then a search can be made. In the event we see a suspicious automobile… we will 
usually follow the vehicle until the driver makes a technical violation of a traffic law. 
Then we have means of making a legitimate search. (Tiffany et al. 1967: 131)  
 
The ubiquity of traffic violations combined with the constitutionality of pretextual stops makes 
traffic enforcement a compelling tool in crime control efforts but also a potentially divisive tool 
of discrimination (Cole 1999). 
 Race and Equal Protection of the Law 
 In rejecting  discrimination challenges under the 4th Amendment in Whren, the Supreme 
Court essentially narrowed all such avenues to the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause 
(Alexander 2010). The due process and equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment reads: 
[…] nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
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The pivotal questions for the 14th Amendment and racial profiling are: (a) does equal protection 
preclude any racial bias in police decisions to enforce the law; and (b) what are the standards for 
proving unconstitutional racial bias?  
 I begin the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on these questions with United States v. 
Armstrong (1996), a case alleging selective, discriminatory prosecution. The Supreme Court 
made it clear that the threshold of proof needed to prove discrimination under the 14th 
Amendment was all but impossible to satisfy—and this may prove especially true for racial 
profiling cases (Withrow and Dailey 2012). Christopher Lee Armstrong alleged that he was 
subject to selective and racially biased prosecution after being convicted for violating federal 
crack cocaine laws. To prove this challenge under the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court 
stated that the appropriate threshold is a "credible showing of differential treatment of similarly 
situated persons." In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that Armstrong "failed to 
identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for 
which [Armstrong] was charged, but were not so prosecuted." In other words, in order to 
successfully prove he was subject to selective and racial discrimination in violation of the 14th 
Amendment's equal protection of the law, Armstrong must prove that selective racial 
discrimination already existed before his case. Ironically, the Supreme Court rejected 
Armstrong's attorney's motions for discovery of government records—the very things Armstrong 
needed to demonstrate patterns of prior discrimination (Alexander 2010). 
 At least two cases since Armstrong have shed light on how a racial profiling challenge to 
the 14th Amendment would hold up in court. Both of these cases reinforce the onerous threshold 
explicated in Armstrong; not only must a plaintiff prove a discriminatory effect in the 
administration of justice (i.e., that significant racial disparity exists in pertinent justice 
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outcomes), but they must also prove discriminatory intent (i.e., that officers, prosecutors, judges, 
were knowingly and deliberately discriminatory on the basis of race).  
 In Chavez v. Illinois State Police (2001), a case alleging racial profiling, the plaintiffs 
failed to meet even the first level of proof: discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs offered as evidence 
information from two Illinois State Police databases; one contained information on citations and 
warnings and the other came from field notes on stops resulting in seizures, arrests, officer 
injuries, and damaged police property. The court found both databases insufficient to prove 
discriminatory effect, arguing that the necessary information (e.g., race/ethnicity of drivers and a 
reliable benchmark) could not be ascertained from the reports.  
 In United States v. Dugue-Nava (2004), plaintiff's successfully proved discriminatory 
effect in the selective targeting of Hispanic motorists, but failed to meet the second level of 
proof: discriminatory intent. Dugue-Nava, who is Hispanic, was convicted for the possession of 
illegal narcotics after being stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently searched by an 
Illinois State Police officer. Dugue-Nava and his attorneys used a statewide racial profiling study 
to "compare the deputy's stops by race against stops made by highway patrol officers working on 
the same interstate highway" (Withrow and Dailey 2012: 131). The study revealed that the 
deputy who stopped Dugue-Nava stopped Hispanic drivers at a significantly higher rate than 
similarly situated deputies. But while the court agreed the study proved clear discriminatory 
effect, it could not prove discriminatory intent. The court ruled that while the study measured 
racial and ethnic disparity in police stops, it did not measure the officer's perceptions and 
motivations for making the stops. Intent, therefore, could only be inferred from patterns of 
disparity—not proven. It is difficult to imagine what, if any, level of data—beyond a 
confession—could successfully prove an individual officer's internal motivations were based on 
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race and race alone. It seems, therefore, that racial profiling challenges based on the 14th 
Amendment's equal protection clause are, like those based on the 4th Amendment's protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, unlikely to be successful. 
 Summary  
 Reinforcing the rugged individualism (Shelden 2010) of colorblindness, the jurisprudence 
I outlined above consistently reproduced the prevailing notion that discrimination is about 
individual intent, not social inequity/disparity—however systematic and apparent it may be. To 
prove discrimination under the Constitution, the burden is on the victim to prove the police 
officer, prosecutor or judge blatantly intended to and in fact did treat the citizen differently 
because of their race—and because of their race alone. One of the problems with the position 
that the courts have taken is that it is overly individualistic and obscures the reality of 
institutional racism—racism that has worked its way into the everyday language and functions of 
the system in subtle and seemingly neutral ways. The requirement that discriminatory intent can 
be proven only when race is the sole factor motivating police stops is a virtually impossible 
standard to meet. Race is rarely the only factor affecting police decisions—and when it is, cases 
such as Whren provide an easy "out" by allowing officers to point to any minor, technical 
violation of the law as a race-neutral justification for the stop. The options for legitimate 
challenges against the criminal justice system have been systematically narrowed over time by 
the courts. This has reduced the likelihood that challenges will be brought before the courts in 
the first place, which in turn strengthens the perception that the system is indeed colorblind and 
fair (Alexander 2010). 
 In terms of racial profiling and police decisions to initiate and enforce traffic stops, the 
first question I asked was whether race and ethnicity can be factored into the police decision 
21 
 
making process. Weaver and Sokolow make it clear that officers can use race to form reasonable 
suspicion, even as part of a profile, so long as race is not the sole reason for their decision to 
stop, cite, search, or arrest. Furthermore, as long as a legal reason for the stop can be articulated 
by the police, the 4th Amendment is not violated by even discriminatory intent of the officer 
(Whren v. United States, 1996).  
 Principles of equal protection under the law, embodied in the 14th Amendment, have far 
less meaning when there are few legitimate and successful avenues to challenge unconstitutional 
practices. There have been few successful challenges to racial discrimination under the equal 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment (Alexander 2010) and the courts have repeatedly 
upheld a near impossible standard of proof—the burden to prove both discriminatory effect and 
the discriminatory intent. 
 The rule of law and colorblind ideals suggest that extralegal categories such as race and 
ethnicity, sex and gender, sexuality, class, religion should not determine criminal justice 
outcomes. The colorblind ideal, of course, has never been realized in practice in the U.S. From 
slave patrols in the 18th century to Jim Crow segregation, policing has always been shaped by 
social divisions along the lines of race and ethnicity (Stokes 2007). There have been glaringly 
similar racial and ethnic divisions reproduced in the current era of justice—an era defined by 
mass incarceration and a draconian war on drugs—as in the previous eras of Jim Crow apartheid 
and slavery (Shelden 2007; Alexander 2010; Waquant 2001). The now ubiquitous war on drugs, 
started by Nixon in the early 1970s and revamped and reenergized under Reagan in the 1980s, 
brought with it attitudes and policies that have led to increasing racial and ethnic inequality in the 
criminal justice system (Western 2006). These trends have been reinforced by the courts on 
multiple fronts. The jurisprudence of the war on drugs era has arguably weakened and perhaps 
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even reversed many civil rights victories of the last 50 years (Alexander 2010). In some ways, 
the war on drugs has brought with it the exact opposite of civil rights: the expansion, not 
limitation, of State power to discriminate against minorities. 
 In Whren v. United States the Supreme Court insulated the subjective intentions of police 
from any 4th Amendment scrutiny while conducting searches and seizures. In Armstrong v. 
United States (1996), the Supreme Court protected the already powerful office of prosecution 
from special scrutiny under the 14th Amendment. Prosecutors are often regarded as the most 
powerful criminal justice actors, possessing widely unchecked discretionary powers to pursue, 
initiate, or divert criminal cases—and they do so with the weight of State resources at their 
disposal. The court applied the strict standards of proof following Armstrong and similar cases to 
two cases alleging racial profiling against the police in Chavez (2001) and Dugue-Nava (2004). 
The courts required plaintiffs to prove knowing and deliberate discriminatory intent by racially 
biased officers—a standard that was not fully met in either of the two cases and is extremely 
unlikely to be met in future cases. 
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Chapter 3 - Racial Profiling and Police Discretion 
Research on racial profiling fits within a larger tradition of research on the scope of 
police discretion, selective enforcement and work attempting to isolate the various legal and 
extralegal factors that influence police decision making. Legal factors are  those characteristics 
that are legally relevant to the suspected violation at hand. Typical legal factors include police-
observed offenses and discovery of illicit contraband, strength of the evidence, seriousness of the 
offense, and age of the suspected offender (for status offenses), the presence of victims and the 
willingness of victims to press charges against the suspect. In contrast, extralegal factors are 
characteristics not directly related to a legal violation, but may affect officer decisions to enforce 
the law regardless. Typical extralegal factors include citizen and officer demographics—such as 
race, class, gender, and age—community context, citizen appearance and demeanor, and the 
presence of victims or innocent bystanders.  
The analysis and distinction between legal and extralegal factors in police decision 
making is crucial because it serves as a tangible way of teasing out the debate between crime 
control and discrimination. Most reasonable analyses would not expect to see only legal factors 
influence police decisions in a just system, but knowing more precisely influence of both legal 
and extralegal factors can give us insight into the role discrimination may be playing in the 
enforcement of law. 
 Choices and the Power to Choose 
 The administration of justice is filled with choices. Walker and Katz (2011) define 
discretion as “an official action” by an agent of the criminal justice system “based on that 
individual’s judgment about the best course of action” (p. 360).  From police decisions to stop 
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drivers on roads and highways to sentencing decisions by judges in the courtroom, discretion is a 
reality of the criminal justice system. 
 The Scope of Police Discretion 
 Officer discretion has long been considered an important issue in modern policing. 
Mastrofski (2004) defines police discretion as "the leeway that officers enjoy in selecting from 
more than once choice in carrying out their work" (p. 101). Typical discretionary actions in 
general law enforcement may include patrolling one area more heavily than another, strict 
enforcement of certain offenses over others (i.e., "crackdowns"), pursuing a vehicle the officer 
believes is suspicious, stopping and questioning juveniles on the street, administering a verbal 
warning in lieu of a ticket, writing an official crime report, searching a stopped driver for illicit 
drugs, making an arrest, using physical force, and so on. Some of the most salient structural and 
situational features of general law enforcement that ensure high levels of "leeway" in police 
decisions include unique police authority, the low visibility of patrol work, decentralized police 
organization, situational exigencies (Bittner 1970), and the structure of the law.  
  Police have considerable authority in their everyday work.  Unlike many other 
professional occupations, discretion in general law enforcement agencies (i.e., local, county, and 
state patrol agencies) increases as one moves down the organizational hierarchy (Seron et al. 
2004).  Described by one set of scholars as a "witch's brew of authority and autonomy," policing 
is organized in a such a way that high levels of officer discretion at the bottom is inevitable 
(Skogan and Meares 2004:68). Working alone or in pairs, patrol officers are rarely directly 
observed by police supervisors or the community (though the age of the internet and small, 
portable video/audio devices has perhaps affected both). The potential for abuse—including 
racial profiling—to go unnoticed or unreported is greater in low-visibility environments.  
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Furthermore, police organization is highly decentralized; officers are expected to exercise their 
professional judgment in a wide array of citizen encounters that may not fit neatly within 
standard operating procedures. Due partially to the low-visibility of patrol work, officers are also 
expected, for the most part, to hold themselves accountable of any wrong doing.  As such, the 
organization of general law enforcement systematically puts low-level patrol officers in the 
position of making critical decisions in routine, day-to-day work.  
 The implications of high levels of discretion in routine patrol work have attracted much 
concern in the literature (Carbado 2002; Kelly 1994; Mastrofsky 2004; Seron, Pereira, Kovath 
2004; Sherman 1984; Skolnick and McCoy 1981).  Much of this literature has focused on abuses 
of officer authority in the unfair or harsh treatment of particular populations (e.g., juveniles, the 
poor, and racial/ethnic minorities).   As gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, police have 
unique authority to bring some people in and keep others out. This is problematic, 
constitutionally and morally, when certain groups of citizens are submitted to differential police 
treatment because of their group status and not simply for their criminal offending. Typical 
notions of fairness hinge upon the notion that police decision making follows legalistic, 
colorblind standards. The rule of law, particularly the legal doctrine of due process and equal 
protection of the law, embodies these ideals of fairness and justice—rational legal standards and 
procedures, not the prejudices of powerful agents or institutionalized discrimination should 
determine legal outcomes. We know, however, that legal factors alone do not always explain the 
realities of police behavior in practice. Crime control efforts are often at odds with constitutional 
guarantees of fair and equitable treatment (Harcourt 2004; Samaha 2005; Wesley 1953). Despite 
the dual mandate of the police to both fight crime and uphold constitutional liberties, the pursuit 
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of crime control often comes at the expense of due process because of the inherent conflict 
between the two models of justice. 
 The Myth of Full Enforcement 
 The full enforcement myth is the popular belief that the police enforce all crimes to the 
full extent of the law, all of the time. Although the full enforcement myth pervades mainstream 
assumptions about the police—likely due, in part, to the active impression management of police 
agencies themselves as well as exaggerated images of the hyper-masculine, crime-fighting street 
cop in popular culture—both practical and socio-political factors constrain full enforcement.  
 Fifty years ago Herman Goldstein (1963) argued that a "policy of 'full enforcement' 
implies that the police are required to enforce all criminal statutes and city ordinances at all times 
against all offenders" (p. 140). For full enforcement to exist, accordingly, officers must be 
"without authority to ignore violations, to warn offenders when violations have in fact occurred, 
or to do anything short of arresting the offender and placing a charge against him for the specific 
crime committed" (Goldstein 1963:140). The broad scope of discretion, however, coupled with 
the practical realities of routine patrol work make the notion of full enforcement problematic. 
 Practically speaking, the police do not directly observe or become aware of every crime, 
much less have the time and resources to enforce each of these crimes. Choices about what, 
where, how and when to enforce the law must be made, by agencies and individual officers and 
supervisors alike. Moreover, even when police become aware of violations, they do not always 
act on them with formal enforcement action (e.g., an arrest). Donald Black's (1976) classic 
research found that the police made arrests in just half of those cases where they had legal cause 
to do so. In contrast to full enforcement, the tendency is under enforcement, even for more 
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serious crimes and those cases where a "willing complainant is present, asking the police to 
make an arrest" (Mastrofski 2004:110).   
 Factors of Selective Enforcement 
 Individual choices of officers do not occur in a social, historical,  or political vacuum. 
The problem of differential treatment of citizens by race, class and gender spans structural, 
organizational, and individual levels of policing (Riksheim and Chermak 1993). Institutional and 
political forces can constrain the choices of individual officers particularly via policy or law 
(Mastrofski 2004). The obvious racial profiling example is the inclusion of race in drug courier 
profiles by certain police agencies in the 1980s and 90s. Racial profiling policies reflected "the 
institutionalization of organizational assumptions about race and criminal suspicion" (Miller 
2009:4). Spatial variation in terms of where police patrol is deployed in a city is another example 
of policy that can affect racial and ethnic disparities in policing outcomes (Glover 2007). 
 Selective enforcement is also shaped by larger socio-political forces. The police are, of 
course, law enforcers not law makers. New police enforcement of alcohol laws during 1920s 
alcohol prohibition was not simply a product of individual officer choices, but of much larger 
cultural and political forces of the time. Similarly, the contemporary war on drugs significantly 
increased selective and punitive police attention on (certain) drug crimes and (certain) drug using 
populations over a short period of time (Beckett et al. 2006). This was less because of individual 
officer choices and more because of systematic changes in law and policy. Furthermore, as a 
matter of law and policy, police attention has not been applied to all drug crimes equally. For 
example, despite relatively high rates of prescription drug abuse nationally (second only to 
marijuana according to the 2008 National Survey of Drug Use and Health), far more police 
resources are devoted to the enforcement of classic "street drugs" (e.g., marijuana, powder and 
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crack cocaine, amphetamines, heroin). Likewise, crack cocaine received far more attention from 
the police, law makers, and the  media in the 1980s than did powder cocaine during the same 
time period (Beckett et al. 2006).  
 Collectively, these punitive drug policies have had a disproportionately affect on 
minorities. In 2006, blacks represented about 14 percent of all illicit drug users (similar to their 
representation in the general population), but comprised 35 percent of those arrested for drug 
offenses and 53 percent of drug convictions (Mauer 2013). Despite having rates of illicit drug 
use similar to that of whites, about three-fourths of those in prison for drug offenses are people of 
color (Mauer 2013). While individual officer choices may certainly influence some of these 
disparities, the policies behind them clearly play an important role as well. 
 Structural class bias appears to be another major factor behind many policies of selective 
enforcement—particularly in the deployment of police services—and likely contributes to the 
racial disparities in policing outcomes as well.  Pepinski (1984) contrasted "streets from the 
suites" to illustrate how police resources are strongly biased toward enforcement of the most 
disadvantaged populations in society. Police deployment and routine enforcement practices (e.g., 
patrolling, investigating, detaining, questioning, searching for evidence of criminal conduct) is as 
possible in the business suites as it is in the streets from a legal perspective, but it is entirely 
implausible from a political perspective (Pepinsky 1984). Indeed, suite crime receives far less 
police attention than street crime despite evidence that more personal and economic harm results 
from white-collar and organizational (i.e., suite) crimes (Reiman and Leighton 2010). 
 Many scholars have discussed the implications of emphasizing street crime over 
organizational and white collar crime, pointing to predictable disparities along intersecting lines 
of race, class and gender (Goode 2002). With an emphasis on the streets, the citizens who come 
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under police surveillance tend to be the most disadvantaged in society. The visibility of 
disadvantaged groups on the street make suitable targets for law enforcement; drug enforcement 
in particular has had much greater success targeting low-level street dealers and users, who often 
happen to be disproportionately poor men and women of color, than high-level distributers and 
wealthy users, who tend to be privileged white men (Goode 2002; Jenkot 2008; Maher 1997). 
The result is an institutionalized bias that emphasizes the crimes of those at the lower rungs of 
society and diminishes the crimes of the most advantaged. 
 We know that selective enforcement is a reality of policing. We also know that structural 
elements of selective enforcement produce inherent biases in terms of where the police are 
deployed, what crimes are enforced, and who receives the bulk of that enforcement (Riksheim 
and Chermak 1993). At the same time, broad structural forces are not the only forces at play in 
the production of racial disparity. Individual officers make choices every day that contribute to 
the larger picture of race and criminal justice. Much policing research has examined the 
conditions under which individual officers choose to invoke the law by making a stop, 
conducting a search, writing a citation or making an arrest. A fuller understanding of the way 
racial disparities are produced 'on the ground' require a close examination of the important 
factors, legal and extralegal, that shape individual officer decision making.  
 Officer Decision Making: Legal versus Extralegal Factors 
 The decisions of officers at the individual level are an important piece of the larger 
picture of selective enforcement and racial disparity. Policy and the law have the potential to 
shape officer decisions, but there may also be a disconnect between the letter of the law and law 
as it is practiced (Black 1980). In reference to racial targeting on streets and highways, Miller 
(2007) notes that "unless [racial profiling] policies are enacted by patrol officers, shift 
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supervisors, middle managers, and police leadership, the policy may be viewed as merely 
symbolic" (253). Knowing when and what  factors influence officer decisions to selectively 
investigate, search and punish drivers is necessary to account for the underlying causes of racial 
disparities in traffic stops. Largely unfettered discretion in routine traffic enforcement facilitates 
the possibility that officers' racial biases, overt or covert, will influence their enforcement 
decisions—even if those decisions conflict with policy or law.  
 Although disparities of race (and class, gender and age) in the criminal justice system are 
well documented, it is not entirely clear if discretion coupled with racist intent leads to disparate 
outcomes (Beckett et al. 2006). It is unlikely that extralegal factors like race are the only 
variables that significantly affect officer decision making. Most research suggests a number of 
factors are at play in officer decision making and racial disparities. When examining racial 
differences in officer decision making, then, it is necessary to consider the relative influence of 
both  legal (e.g., seriousness of the crime, strength of evidence) and extralegal (e.g., citizen race, 
class, gender, age, demeanor) factors to help account for a wider set of plausible explanations.  
  The debate over which factors matter most in officer decision making was the subject of 
much of the classic policing research in the 1960s and 70s. The influence of extralegal factors 
such as race was a central focus of this research, and its role in police decision making continues 
to be vigorously contested in the field. Racial profiling research has largely neglected to fully 
consider much of the previous work on officer decision making despite the fact that both 
literatures are, in many ways, concerned with similar things (Engel and Calnon 2004).  
 One of the lessons of this early literature is that officer decision making and selective 
enforcement is always couched in a complex, multi-layered context (Riksheim and Chermak 
1993).  These contexts can contain any number of influential legal and extralegal factors at the 
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situational, organizational, community, and individual levels. The most influential legal factors 
examined in the literature tend to include seriousness of the crime (for example Shafer et al. 
2006; Smith and Visher 1981; Stroshine et al. 2008) and strength of the evidence (see Bittner 
1972; Pepinsky 1984). Salient extralegal factors in the literature include the preference of the 
victim (see Smith and Visher 1981), demeanor of the citizen (for example Gross and Livingston 
2002; Westley 1953), race, class and sex of citizens (for example Bela-Walker 2003; Engel and 
Calnon 2004; Gross and Barnes 2002; Harris 2002, 1997; Martin 1999; Piliavin and Briar 1964; 
Smith and Visher 1981), and community characteristics (for example Durand 2009; Johnson 
2004; Howell et al. 2004; Garrett 2000; Meehan and Ponder 2002; Smith 1986; Livingston 
1997). 
 In 1958, the American Bar Foundation Survey provided one of the first formal reports of 
police misconduct that considered the impact of extralegal factors on officer decision making. 
The survey reported that racism, lawlessness and unprofessionalism were common aspects of 
police behavior. In a following major study, Piliavin and Briar (1964) observed and analyzed 
seventy-six separate police encounters with juveniles to empirically account for the factors that 
shaped officer decision making. They found that both legal and extralegal factors mattered. Their 
study marked one of the first attempts at understanding police decision making using rigorous 
social scientific methodology.  
 Piliavin and Briar's study was influential in highlighting the complexity of police 
decisions, but also the way race influences differential treatment of citizens at the hands of the 
police. They found that police departments not only tolerated, but openly endorsed high levels of 
individual officer discretion in the enforcement of juvenile crime. This endorsement was due in 
part to the rising professionalization movement in policing—the claim that officers, as 
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professionals, were trained in specialized street knowledge. Highlighting this discretion, officers 
seemed genuinely concerned about bringing juveniles into the formal system. Many officers 
expressed reservations against the arrest of juveniles and believed that official action could prove 
more detrimental than not in the long run because of the negative stigma associated with a 
criminal record. Not surprisingly, when officers did make an arrest the seriousness of the offense 
in question was important; the more serious the crime, the more likely officers would use arrest 
to punish the juvenile.  
 Alongside legal factors such as the seriousness of the crime, extralegal factors mattered 
as well in Piliavin and Briar's (1964) study. The appearance and demeanor of the juveniles in 
particular affected officer decisions to make an arrest. Uncooperative and/or disrespectful 
juveniles were more likely to be arrested than those the police perceived to be more submissive 
and compliant. Discrimination against black juveniles was common. Officers were more likely to 
stop and question juveniles without legal cause when these juveniles were black. Furthermore, 
the use of race as a determining factor in police decision making led to self-fulfilling 
consequences. Stereotypes about black criminal propensity influenced more punitive officer 
dispositions in their interactions with black juveniles. This disproportionate punitiveness 
increased the likelihood of formal sanctions like arrest, which in turn was seen as evidence that 
justified the stereotype of black juvenile offenders. 
 The findings of Piliavin and Briar's study sparked growing scholarly interest in police 
discretion and decision making. Scholars were interested in the role that race played in officer 
decision making in particular. Some argue, however, that since the civil rights social movements 
of the 60s and 70s, blatant racism in law, policy and policing has mostly given way to a more 
legalistic, colorblind model of policing (Withrow 2006). A new challenge has thus emerged for 
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researches to explain existing racial disparity in policing outcomes while couched in an era of 
colorblindness and the language of racial neutrality (Glover 2007). The picture painted by the 
extant literature is a complex one, and a combination of both legal and extralegal factors appear 
relevant. 
Many scholars since Piliavin and Briar (1964) have found legal factors to be among the 
most influential determinants of police behaviors (for example Black and Reiss 1972; Alpert, 
Macdonald, and Dunham 2005; Terrill and Paoline 2007). Seriousness of the alleged offense is 
one of the most consistent predictors of police decisions to administer sanctions. For example, 
the police are more likely to  make an arrest when the alleged offense is a felony compared to a 
misdemeanor (Black and Reiss 1970; Sherman 1980; Riksheim and Chermak 1993). In addition 
to the seriousness of the offense, Black and Reiss (1970) found that officers are more likely to 
make an arrest when they observe the offense themselves. Similarly, Mastrofski (2000) found 
that the likelihood of arrest rose significantly with the strength of the evidence.  
Other work examining arrest decisions illustrate the complexity of police decision 
making, however. Smith and Visher (1981) found that police arrest decisions reflect both legal 
and extralegal considerations. Specifically, they found that the arrest decision was influenced by 
dispositional preferences of the victim (e.g., when the victim does not want to press charges 
against the suspect), the race of the suspect, the demeanor of the suspect, and the presence of 
innocent bystanders. Smith and Visher (1981) also found that while girls and women committed 
fewer crimes over all, men and women were equally likely to be arrested—a finding that 
contradicted the popular notion that females are more likely to receive leniency by the police.  
Looking at officer decisions not to invoke the law, Terrill and Paoline (2007) found that 
nonarrest was far more common (in the order of about 4 to 1) than arrest, even controlling for 
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presence of legal evidence and seriousness of the offense. In those cases of nonarrest, officers 
employed a wide range of rationales for why they chose alternatives to arrest—ranging from 
suspect demeanor, officer empathy, paper work avoidance, and notions of what is "just 
punishment"—illustrating in greater detail the complexity of (non)arrest decisions (p. 326). In 
their multivariate analysis, the researchers found no evidence for the direct influence of race, sex 
and income on nonarrest.  
 There is some evidence that place matters as a situational and extralegal factor in police 
decision making. The relationship between race and place has received much discussion in the 
literature, particularly in how police agencies direct more patrol to poorer, typically minority 
areas with increased scrutiny and surveillance of citizen behaviors (Alpert et al. 2007). These 
patrol assignments can in turn lead to higher likelihoods of stops, citations, searches and arrests 
for residents and pedestrians of the target areas (Meehan and Ponder 2002). When areas of a city 
or town are racially and ethnically segregated (and most major cities in the U.S. remain quite 
segregated), places may become proxies for citizen race (Glover 2007).  
 In a study of police profiling practices in Kansas by The Police Foundation (2003), 
researchers looked at the distribution of police stop and search practices across real city space. 
They found that some patrol beats had much higher rates of stops and searches compared to 
others.  Beats with higher recorded crime rates and beats with higher proportions of minority 
residents saw the highest rates of stops and searches.  More importantly, profiling practices that 
disproportionately targeted black and Hispanic drivers for routine traffic stops varied 
significantly from place to place, but were more likely in beats with greater proportions of 
minority residents. It is unclear from the study, however, if citizen behavior or other plausible 
legal factors (e.g., type of traffic infraction) affected the disproportionate stops and searches of 
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minorities in those places. Another study by Novak and Chamlin (2012) found that areas with 
higher density of racial minority residents increased search rates, but did so only for whites in 
'black spaces' (294). 
 Stroshine, Alpert, and Dunham (2008) utilized observational data from two metropolitan 
areas to develop a set of "working rules" that police use to determine courses of action while on 
patrol. The researchers organized these "rules" into 12 substantive themes: the importance of 
time and place; the importance of appearance; the importance of information; the importance of 
behavior; fairness; threshold; pissing off the police; safety; one act evolves into another; keeping 
busy; work shirking; and other rules (Stroshine et al. 2008:322-334). The authors argued these 
rules highlight the multidimentionality of police decision making. In other words, many different 
factors may have an important influence on officer decisions and one factor, such as race, cannot 
explain officer decision making completely.  Indeed, in the author's study only a few of the 
verbatim statements by officers explicitly used race when indicating the circumstances that 
raised their suspicions. One officer stated that "[i]n an all-black area, whenever they see a new 
vehicle, they will check it out and make sure it's not stolen" and that they also do this "because 
it's a low income housing area" (p. 325). Another officer explained that "Whites in Black 
neighborhoods are either buying drugs, soliciting prostitutes, or lost," whereas "Blacks in 'beat 
up' cars in white neighborhoods between 9 a.m. and 12 p.m. might be getting ready to rob a 
house" (p. 323).   
 While the relative infrequency of officers' explicit use of race in developing suspicion or 
taking enforcement action appears to support Stroshine et al.'s claim that race and ethnicity has 
little effect on officer decision making, the authors ignore the ways in which race may operate in 
implicit or subtle ways via racial-neutral language (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Glover 2007). Factors 
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that seem colorblind on the surface may be still shaped by subtle preconceptions and stereotypes 
about race and crime (Alexander 2010; Smith and Alpert 2007). Given the incendiary nature of 
the politics of race in the U.S.—bolstered by the significant media attention racial profiling has 
received over the last two decades—officers may be especially wary of openly admitting to 
outsiders that race plays a major role in their decision making (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Popular 
notions of colorblindness and political correctness make it remarkable that officers would ever 
openly admit to outsiders that race plays any role in their enforcement decisions.  As such, 
officers may frame their accounts of suspicion in decidedly race-neutral terms. For example, one 
officer said that he checks out certain parks because "many drug deals occur there" and he will 
also deliberately patrol "known drug areas" looking for "suspicious activity" (Stroshine et al. 
2008:323). It is possible that racial and ethnic bias is still at work in these decisions, even when 
they are reported in the race-neutral language of place and crime (Harris 2002).  
 There has been some debate over whether and what characteristics of individual officers 
matter when it comes to the exercise of discretion and racial bias. Researchers have especially 
emphasized the potential influence of officers’ race, sex and education. Walker and Katz (2008) 
warn that “the characteristics of individual officers do not appear to have a major influence on 
police behavior” (p. 367). The results of empirical studies thus far have been mixed. Looking at 
officer decisions to ticket stopped drivers, Gilliard-Matthews et al. (2008) found that Black 
officers are slightly less likely to ticket black traffic-code breakers in 2002 than in 1999, while 
white officers were more likely to ticket all drivers of color in 1999 and 2002. Donohue and 
Levitt (2001) found that an increase in black police officers in a department was associated with 
only slightly higher arrest rates for whites, while higher white officers in a department was 
associated with a small increase in non-white arrests.  Studies in New York City and San Jose 
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departments found that Black and Hispanic officers received complaints in similar proportions to 
their representation in the departments (Walker and Katz 2011).  Hickman and Piquero (2009) 
found that, in 496 large municipal departments, minority officer representation in the department 
did not have an effect on the probability of receiving citizen complaints.   
 In general, the above research indicates both legal and extralegal variables affect police 
practices, and likely in complex ways. Police respond to the seriousness of the crime, calls for 
service, preferences of the victim, suspect relationship to the victim, and suspect deference to 
officer authority in decisions to initiate an encounter, cite, and arrest suspects. Police also appear 
to employ a wider net of suspicion and apply harsher sanctions to those in disadvantaged social 
positions/neighborhoods, including poorer suspects, juveniles, and racial/ethnic minorities 
(Black 1970; Gilliard-Matthews et al. 2008; Harcourt 2004; Mastrofski 1984; Meehan and 
Ponder 2002; Pepinsky 1984; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Smith and Visher 1981).  
 Several "take home messages" can be also drawn from the extant literature in regards to 
race and officer decision making. The police seek to maximize control in citizen encounters by 
acting in ways that maintain "inequality of power and authority between police and the public" 
(Smith and Visher 1981:175). The police respond more harshly in circumstances that interfere 
with or at least challenge this disparity of power in order to reaffirm their authority in the 
situation. This power gap and "social distance" between police and citizens may help explain 
harsher enforcement of racial/ethnic minorities and the poor compared to whites and the more 
wealthy (Black 1976). The police also tend to allocate more patrol resources to disadvantaged 
areas and are more likely to employ aggressive tactics in these areas. Likewise, if the police 
perceive minorities as more threatening or less submissive to officer authority, they may be 
quicker to act more harshly compared to whites (Harcourt 2004; Pepinsky 1984). African 
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Americans, for example, are more likely to hold antagonistic views of the police compared to 
whites (Jones-Brown 2007). Stereotypes painting minorities as the "symbolic assailant" 
(Skolnick 1966) may increase officer expectations of conflict in citizen encounters with 
minorities, in turn leading to self-fulfilling prophecies and more punitive outcomes (Smith and 
Alpert 2007). 
 Racial Profiling and Traffic Stops 
 Traffic stop encounters are an important context of racial disparity in policing and 
warrant special analysis for a couple reasons. First, a traffic stop encounter is the most common 
form of police-initiated contact with the public, accounting for about fifty percent of all face-to-
face citizen contact in 2005 (Durose et al. 2007). Second, traffic stops are largely proactive—
unlike reactive calls for service, for example, officers have a tremendous amount of  discretion in 
choosing which traffic stops to initiate.  
 Although most traffic enforcement is considered largely routine and uneventful, traffic 
stops can also be used as a proactive method of crime-fighting. For example, traffic stops were 
an especially exploited tool in drug interdiction on particular stretches of highways in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Harris 2002). Legal authority flowing from citizens' reduced expectations of privacy 
in automobiles, the power to stop and search drivers, passengers and vehicles provides officers 
with a broad range of lawful means to discover evidence of criminal conduct (e.g., an arrest 
warrant or illicit contraband) that otherwise would have remained hidden. The implications of 
this broad scope of discretion on civil liberties and racial disparities makes traffic stops 
especially pertinent in discussions of police decision making. 
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 Officer Decisions to Initiate the Stop 
One of the first questions asked by early empirical studies of racial profiling was whether 
racial minorities were being singled out and stopped more frequently than white drivers. The first 
major empirical analyses of this question was the New Jersey Turnpike study. The study was 
prompted by a lawsuit began in 1990, State v. Pedro Soto, alleging that New Jersey state troopers 
were improperly using driver's race to conduct traffic stops. The defendants' main expert witness, 
John Lamberth, set out to empirically test the allegation.  
 Lamberth compared police data on traffic stops, citations and arrests between 1988 and 
1991 to observational data estimating I-95 driving population and speed limit violations by race 
(Harris 2002). To estimate the driving population along the relevant stretch of highway, 
observers counted drivers at randomly chosen times and days, noting the (perceived) race of 
drivers. To measure drivers who were speeding, researchers used a rolling survey technique—
trained observers drove in vehicles at the posted speed limit along different stretches of highway 
and recorded the drivers who passed them, thus obtaining a benchmark for the population of 
speeding drivers. In all, these data included observations of forty-two thousand cars (Harris 
2002).  
 The results of the New Jersey study were striking. Though black drivers represented 
about 13% of the driving population on the highway where alleged abuse took place, they 
comprised roughly 73% of those stopped and arrested by the police. Importantly, there was no 
statistical difference in driving behavior between black drivers and white drivers; both groups in 
fact violated traffic laws equally and frequently—speeding being the most common offense. The 
only real difference between these groups of drivers that could have influenced police decisions 
to stop, according to Lamberth and defendants in State v. Pedro Soto, was skin color. Based on 
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these findings, Lamberth claimed that the racial disparities were more likely than not the result of 
racial profiling.   
 A similar study from around the same time, stemming again from lawsuits claiming racial 
bias in police stop practices, found similar results. Data from observations along I-95 in 
Maryland showed that black drivers represented about 17 percent of the driving population found 
to be speeding but comprised about 73 percent of all those drivers stopped and subsequently 
searched (Lamberth 1996).  
 Together, the New Jersey and Maryland cases substantiated widespread suspicions (and 
confirmed what many communities of color already knew all too well): that police routinely used 
race as an indicator of citizen criminal propensity. Police responses ranged from denial to 
justification (see Harris 2002), but growing political and cultural concerns over the racially 
charged phenomenon eventually gave way to a legitimacy crisis in policing (Miller 2007; 
Withrow 2006). In response to increased public scrutiny, many police agencies across the 
country openly condemned the practice and began to collect demographic data (some 
voluntarily, some mandated by Federal and State law) for traffic stops.  
 Collectively, most studies of police-collected data confirm that minority drivers are 
stopped disproportionately in traffic encounters. Withrow (2006), for example, reviewed twenty-
four studies ranging from 1996-2004, nineteen of which found minorities were stopped at 
disproportionate rates compared to their representation in the general population or some other 
population benchmark. It is not clear from these studies, however, if racial bias was a direct 
cause of the disparity. 
 In thinking about disproportionate stop frequencies among whites and minority drivers, 
the reason for the stop is important. There are a number of plausible legal reasons, from petty to 
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severe, that may influence an officer's decision to make a stop. Like decisions to arrest, decisions 
to initiate stops likely vary in accordance with the seriousness of the observed traffic infraction: 
the more serious the infraction, the more likely officers are to make a stop. Likewise, the 
seriousness of the traffic violation or the type of traffic violation likely correlate with the 
outcome of the stop. As critics of the Whren v. U.S. decision argue, and as many anecdotal 
accounts have attested to, minorities appear to be disproportionately stopped on pretext (Harris 
2002; Lundman and Kaufman 2003). The "pretext hypothesis" suggests that searches are more 
likely in stops of minority drivers when the reason for the traffic stop is a minor violation (such 
as a cracked windshield, for example). Stops for more serious traffic violations, on the other 
hand (such as reckless driving) should be more likely to result in a citation or an arrest than a 
stop for a minor vehicle defect.  
 The relationship between driver race and the reason for the stop, while implied in many 
discussions of racial profiling, remains under analyzed empirically. There is some evidence that 
whites are more likely to be stopped for moving violations and more serious offenses while black 
drivers are more likely to be stopped in situations where officers have high levels of discretion 
(Novak 2004; Greenwald 2003; Withrow 2002). The evidence is limited, however, and there 
remains much room in the literature for the analysis of race and the reason for the stop.  
 Officer Decisions After the Stop 
 While many early empirical analyses of racial profiling emphasized disparities in police 
decisions to initiate stops of minorities compared to whites, research has increasingly looked to 
the outcomes of traffic stops (Donohue and Levitt 2001; Engel and Calnon 2004; Gilliard-
Matthews et al. 2008; Knowles, Persico and Todd 2001; Novak 2004; Lundman 2004; Schafer, 
Carter, Katz-Bannister and Wells 2006; Smith and Petrocelli 2001; Withrow 2007; Zingraff et al. 
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2000). Officers are confronted with a number of potential courses of action in any given traffic 
stop. Such decisions may include questioning the driver and any passengers, searching the 
vehicle and/or driver, and the administration of sanctions such as warnings, citations, and arrests. 
The evidence of racial disparities in these potential courses of action are complex and mixed; 
empirical results vary depending on the data examined and which stop outcomes are analyzed. 
 Findings of racial differences in police decisions to sanction (warnings, citations, and 
arrests) drivers have been mixed, especially for citations. Some studies have found that  blacks 
and Hispanics are more likely to receive a citation (Cox et al. 2001; Engel and Calnon 2004; 
Farrell et al. 2004; Gillard-Matthews et al. 2008) whereas others have found the opposite (Novak 
2004; Schafer et al. 2006; Smith and Petrocelli 2001;  Zingraff et al. 2000). There is some 
evidence that minorities are more likely to be arrested in traffic stops (Spitzer 1999; Engel and 
Calnon 2004; Withrow 2002, 2003), though there are notable exceptions. For example, Novak 
(2004) and Smith and Petrocelli (2001) both found that minority drivers are less likely to receive 
a citation or be arrested compared to white drivers. 
 Though relatively rare, traffic stop searches represent a particularly intrusive form of 
police coercion. Racial disparities in police decisions to search are also among the most 
consistent findings in the racial profiling literature. Most racial profiling studies to date have 
found that black and Hispanic drivers are searched at disproportionately high rates compared to 
white drivers (Fallik and Novak 2012; Tillyer and Klahm 2011).  In addition to the likelihood of 
a search occurring, knowing the "successfulness" of searches is important because it can serve to 
confirm officer suspicions of the driver's culpability. Though finding illicit evidence in a search 
does not rule out racial discrimination by the police, it is at least a conservative estimate of 
crime- as opposed to race-driven policing.  
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 A successful search is typically defined in the literature as a search that uncovers illegal 
evidence—when examining searches in aggregate, the group-level likelihood that searches 
uncover illicit contraband is commonly referred to as the "hit rate" (Harcourt 2004).  One of the 
most common, and oldest, justifications for profiling practices on the basis of race/ethnicity is 
the belief that minorities are more likely than whites to be carrying illegal contraband (e.g., such 
as in the transportation of illegal drugs). While the likelihood of discovering evidence in a traffic 
stop and search has received relatively little multivariate analysis, it is a quickly growing area of 
concern in racial profiling research (Lundman 2004; Novak 2012; Tillyer and Klahm 2011). 
 Some scholars have argued that that if hit rates are greater for minorities than whites, then 
disproportionate searches of minority drivers indicates that police are motivated by legal factors, 
not racial bias (Gross and Barnes 2002; Knowles et al. 2001). If, on the other hand, hit rates are 
lower for minorities compared to whites, then disproportionate searches of minority drivers 
could be  considered evidence of racial bias. The empirical findings of racial differences in 
search hit rates have consistently found that searches of minority drivers are not more likely to 
uncover evidence of illicit activity (for example Engel and Calnon 2004; Knowles et al. 2001; 
Lamberth 1996; Lundman 2004; McCorkle 2003; Schafer et al. 2006; Zingraff et al. 2000). Few 
of these studies, however, have taken into full account the legal authority to search (Fallik and 
Novak 2012). Because policy or other legal factors may compel an officer to make a search (e.g., 
searches following an arrest), it is unclear in most studies if the search was compelled by policy 
or driven by an officer discretion. In one of the few studies that differentiated between 
discretionary and non-discretionary searches, Schafer et al. (2006) found that minority drivers 
are more likely to be subject to non-discretionary searches compared to whites (though 
minorities were no more likely to be found with illicit contraband). In contrast, Tillyer and 
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Klahm (2011) found that black citizens were more likely than whites to be found carrying illegal 
contraband in discretionary searches and less likely than whites to found with contraband in 
mandatory/non-discretionary searches. As it stands, there is still much room in the literature to 
examine the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary searches as it relates to 
racial and ethnic (and class and gender) differences. 
 With a few exceptions, most studies examining the incidence of racial profiling have 
been based on police-collected data (Lundman 2004). Additionally, most analyses of racial 
differences in stops and stop outcomes have been at the bivariate level and have not controlled 
for other plausibly important legal and extralegal factors using multivariate statistical techniques 
(Withrow 2006). One of the more comprehensive analyses of traffic stop outcomes using non-
police collected data and multivariate techniques was conducted by Engel and Calnon (2004). 
Using self-report data from the 1999 Police-Public Contact Survey, Engel and Calnon (2004) 
found evidence for racial/ethnic bias in several discrete traffic stop outcomes. Controlling for 
other legal and extralegal variables, black and Hispanic drivers who were stopped and 
subsequently searched were 50 percent and 42 percent more likely, respectively, to experience a 
search compared to white drivers. The odds of black drivers receiving a ticket were 47 percent 
greater than white drivers and the odds for Hispanics were 82 percent greater. Black drivers were 
also 79 percent more likely to be arrested and 2.1 times more likely to have force used against 
them in a traffic stop compared to whites. Even when legal variables such as the reason for the 
stop and the discovery of illegal contraband (drugs or weapons) were controlled for, driver race 
and ethnicity significantly predicted traffic stop outcomes. Young black and Hispanic males 
were significantly more likely to be ticketed, searched, arrested, and have force used against 
them than older, white, and female drivers. 
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 Despite the proliferation of racial profiling research over the past two decades, the 
findings of this work have been mixed. Many studies have found significant racial disparities in 
the likelihood of being stopped by the police. Few studies, however, have empirically measured 
discretion as it is related to driver race, class, gender and being stopped. Though some analyses 
have found that minority drivers are more likely than white drivers to receive formal sanctions 
(citations or arrests)  in traffic stops, others have found that minority drivers are no more likely to 
receive sanctions compared to white drivers. One of the most consistent findings in the literature 
is the disproportionate rate at which minority drivers are searched. Likewise, minority drivers 
appear no more likely to be carrying illegal contraband compared to white drivers (Harcourt 
2007). Despite this consistency, however, very few studies have examined the racial and ethnic 
disparities in searches while also accounting for the legal authority to conduct a search. As such, 
it is unclear from the literature as a whole if the level of officer discretion in searches varies by 
race and ethnicity (Schafer et al. 2006) and if this has an impact on the likelihood of discovering 
evidence of wrongdoing. Furthermore, most studies to date have analyzed racial and ethnic 
disparities at the bivariate level and few have accounted for the numerous other plausible legal 
and control factors that may also influence police decisions to initiate, investigate, and punish 
drivers in traffic stops (Engel and Calnon 2004; Fallik and Novak 2012; Lundman 2004; Schafer 
et al. 2006; Tillyer et al. 2012). 
  Contradictory evidence combined with important theoretical and empirical limitations 
leaves many questions in the racial profiling literature unanswered. First, many previous studies 
of racial disparities in traffic stops have been limited in terms of the legal and other control 
factors considered alongside race and ethnicity. Likewise, there is little theoretical development 
in the racial profiling literature to provide direction in terms of explaining the relationship 
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between legal and extralegal factors and the debate between crime control and discrimination in 
traffic stops. In other words, even in those cases where significant disparity exists between white 
drivers and minority drivers, there are several other factors, legal and extralegal, that may 
provide plausible explanations for these differences (Warren et al. 2006). Second, previous 
bivariate and multivariate examinations of stop outcomes have treated each stop outcome as a 
discrete possibility (e.g., a stop that results in a citation vs a stop that results in an arrest). But 
stop outcomes are not discrete or naturally mutually exclusive; multiple enforcement outcomes 
may occur in any given traffic stop (e.g., a stop that results in both a citation and an arrest). 
Third, previous studies have found mixed evidence of racial disparities in police decisions to 
initiate an automobile stop. One of the biggest methodological limitations of this body of 
research is there is no universally accepted way of measuring base line traffic populations—this 
is particularly problematic in studies considering the proportional rates of stops by racial and 
ethnic groups. Some have suggested that the police are more likely to stop minority drivers for 
more discretionary reasons compared to white drivers, but this proposition remains under 
analyzed in the empirical literature. As such, the relationship between discretion and the decision 
to stop minority drivers remains unclear. Finally, most examinations of racial profiling have not 
accounted for the interlocking nature of race, ethnicity and gender in traffic stops.  
 Theory: Making Sense of the Disparities 
 Despite notable exceptions, studies of racial profiling in traffic stops have generally 
found some evidence for racial and ethnic disparities between white and non-white drivers in 
certain traffic stop outcomes. The most consistent evidence of racial disparity in the literature 
exists between white drivers' and black drivers' likelihoods of being searched during a traffic 
stop. Other work has also suggested that black and Hispanic drivers are more somewhat more 
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likely than white drivers to be stopped, cited and arrested. More recent work, however, has found 
evidence to suggest that racial disparities in stops, citations, arrests and searches may be 
explained by legal and other control factors. As such, there are contradictions the empirical 
literature about the extent of racial and ethnic disparity in select traffic stop outcomes. There is 
still less consensus in the literature as to what explains the disparity when it does exist—whether 
crime control concerns are driving the differences or if it is discrimination.  
 There has been little explicit theoretical attention aimed at racial profiling in empirical 
work thus far as well. That said, there are two basic theoretical positions brought to bear on 
racial profiling, often indirectly or implied (which I have spoke to already), in the literature and 
each frames racial disparities differently. These two positions represent broad and competing 
perspectives on police decision making in general, but are applicable to the narrower question of 
racial profiling in traffic stops too. I refer to these positions as the "crime control" and the 
"discriminatory" perspectives of policing. Arguments from the crime control perspective 
generally assume that police decision making is driven by legal factors and concerns about 
public safety. The crime control perspective assumes that policing is primarily shaped by citizen 
behavior, not citizen social status (e.g., black, white, man, woman). According to this 
perspective, racial disparities are the result of the rational motivation of police to maximize 
effective crime-fighting and the differential participation in crime and violence by racial 
minorities. The discriminatory perspective, on the other hand, assumes that racial disparities in 
policing are the result of conscious or unconscious racial bias, which can manifest at the 
individual or institutional level (or both). In other words, the discriminatory perspective asserts 
that police decision making is shaped in large part by what citizens are, not what citizens do.  
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 The empirical racial profiling literature has not fully resolved the dispute between these 
two perspectives. One reason for this is that the literature as a whole points to both crime control 
concerns and discrimination as possible factors that shape policing decisions and has done so 
without clear theoretical frameworks to explain the distinction between the two. Additionally, the 
more narrow field of racial profiling in traffic stops is still young and lacks the level of 
theoretical  development that exists in other, more established criminal justice literatures (Tillyer 
and Hartley 2010). To help fill this gap, I develop a theory of policing vehicle stops that draws 
on elements from both crime control and discriminatory perspectives. Specifically, I use focal 
concerns theory (Steffensmeier et al. 1998) and the notion of "symbolic assailants" (Skolnick 
1966, 1995) to frame my hypotheses and guide my analysis. My goal is to more explicitly 
distinguish between the relative importance of crime control and legal factors compared with 
discriminatory and extralegal factors in police decisions to initiate and resolve traffic stops.  
 Efficient Policing and the Crime Control Perspective 
 The crime control perspective of policing assumes that the police are primarily motivated 
by crime and disorder. This is, after all, police goal number one dating at least as far back as the 
so-called origin of modern policing in 1829 London (see Lentz and Chaires 2007 for a historical 
critique of "Peel's Principles"). Crime control principles assume that the police are primarily 
concerned about legal factors that infer culpability (or at least reasonable suspicion of guilt) in an 
effort to fight crime and maintain order in the community. Following this logic, racial and ethnic 
disparities in policing outcomes should be explained by differential offending rates of those 
groups. As former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, Bernard Parks, stated, "It's not 
the fault of police… It's the fault of minority males for committing the crime. In my mind it is 
not a great revelation that if officers are looking for criminal activity, they're going to look at the 
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kind of people who are listed on crime reports" (quoted in Lundman 2004:310). In other words, 
the crime control perspective assumes that racial disparities are an accurate reflection of criminal 
offender populations.  
 Arguments taking the crime control view of the police are often accompanied by 
colorblind language, and typically equate racial neutrality with standards of fairness and equal 
protection of the law (Miller 2007). At the same time, the crime control perspective does not rule 
out considerations of race and ethnicity in enforcement decisions. The question and apparent 
contradiction of racial specificity and colorblindness is especially relevant in contemporary legal 
scholarship: Can race be used by the police in the lawful and rational pursuit of justice? The 
answer, for many crime control advocates, lies in the extent to which race signals actual criminal 
propensity in individuals. This seemingly contradictory logic has been referred to by some as 
"reasonable racism" or "colorblind racism" (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008; Kennedy 1997).  
However, if actual traffic or drug law violations vary by race and ethnicity, then racial profiling 
may be little more than a rational attempt to maximize effective enforcement (MacDonald 2001; 
Harcourt 2007). 
 There are other plausible ways in which race can be explicitly used by law enforcement—
not necessarily because of overt racial bias or unlawful discrimination but because race, along 
with other factors, constitutes reasonable suspicion or probable cause. For example, the race of 
citizens can be explicitly used by the police in suspect descriptions (see Bela-Walker 2003 for a 
critique of this practice). Furthermore, a "totality of the circumstances" argument (for example, 
see U.S. v. Weaver, 1992) asserts that the consideration of race is rational when it is but one 
factor among many that signal to the seasoned officer that a crime has been committed. 
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 The crime control perspective is often framed as simply good police work (see 
MacDonald 2001 and Harris 2002). Regardless of race and ethnicity, if you run a red light, you 
get pulled over. Regardless of race and ethnicity, if you are found with cocaine in your vehicle, 
you get arrested. The crime control perspective on racial disparities, then, hinges on the 
differential offending thesis: the notion that minorities commit a disproportionate amount of 
crime compared to whites. At the national level, official estimates of crime lend some credence 
to the assertion that blacks commit proportionately more crime than whites. For example, 
consider these statistics: in 2010 blacks made up about 13 percent of the U.S. population but 38 
percent of homicide offenders; blacks are arrested for illicit drug offences at 2-11 times the rate 
as whites; and in 2010 racial and ethnic minorities made up more than 60 percent of the U.S. 
prison population (Peterson 2012). While the representativeness of official measures of crime are 
problematic—meaning they are biased measures of the racial and ethnic makeup of the total 
criminal offending population—they remain widely used by criminal justice officials as 
conventional estimates of criminal offending.  
 The differential offending thesis underlies crime control justifications for racial 
disparities in criminal statistics. But compared to official measures of violent  and property 
crime, it is even less clear from the available evidence that minorities engage in 
disproportionately more traffic offenses than whites. There have been relatively few attempts to 
directly measure total traffic offending by race and ethnicity (Withrow 2006). Part of the reason 
for this may be the nature of traffic laws and driving habits. Ostensibly speaking, it is likely that 
traffics law violations are pervasive among the driving population because of the sheer volume 
of technical codes regulating vehicles and driving behavior (Harris 2002). Similarly, the low 
level of seriousness  and the victimless nature of most traffic offenses make precise estimates of 
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traffic offending by different demographic groups difficult to measure with official statistics. 
When a violent or property crime is committed, there is often a clear victim. In the case of most 
minor traffic violations, there is no record of it and no clear victim to report it. For these reasons, 
it is difficult to say with certainty what total traffic offending populations look like, much less 
the racial proportions of total traffic offending.  
 Despite the difficulties associated with measuring total traffic offending, there have been 
a few notable examples of research which has attempted to measure samples of traffic law 
violators in geographic-specific areas. For example, Covington (2001) and Lamberth (1994) 
found that racial minorities are no more likely to speed than whites. In contrast, Lange, 
Blackman and Johnson (2001) found that black drivers were overrepresented and white drivers 
underrepresented among speeders along a 65mph stretch of New Jersey turnpike (Withrow 
2006). MacDonald (2003) reported that although black drivers account for an estimated 10 
percent of the driving population, they account for 16 percent of drivers involved in accidents 
resulting in an injury and 13 percent of drivers involved in accidents resulting in death—though 
it is unclear if the disproportionate representation of black drivers in accidents involving injury 
or death is indicative of their increased propensity for aggressive driving or something else 
(Withrow 2006). In short, the results of these studies are mixed and inconclusive.  
 The level of discretion involved in different traffic offenses is also important from a 
crime control perspective. Speeding, while the most common reason for a traffic stop (Eith and 
Durose 2011), is only one among many legal reasons for which drivers can be stopped by the 
police. Traffic offenses can include vehicle defects, record checks, moving violations (e.g., stop 
sign/light violations), and drunk driver check lanes to name a few. While most scholars in the 
literature consider the level of discretion in traffic stops to be relatively high compared to other 
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policing decisions, there has been little empirical examination of variations in levels of discretion 
involved in traffic enforcement (Alpert et al. 2005).  
 Variations in police discretion and selective enforcement of traffic stops are likely 
affected by many situational (e.g., variable traffic patterns by area of city/town/highway/road and 
by day/month/year) and legal factors (e.g., seriousness of the offense). It is also likely that levels 
of discretion in traffic stops are not evenly distributed across different types of offenses or even 
within similar types of offenses. Some offenses, because of department policy or because of their 
seriousness, may compel officers to take action. For example, an officer arguably exercises less 
discretion when they stop a speeder driving 20 miles an hour over the speed limit compared to a 
speeder driving 3 miles an hour over the limit. The location of where the offense is observed may 
also affect the exercise of discretion—speeding in residential and school zones may be perceived 
as more dangerous than speeding on the highway or in rural areas. General traffic patterns may 
also matter—speeding in areas/times with greater traffic congestion (e.g., large metropolitan 
areas during rush hour) may be perceived as more dangerous and receive more police attention 
than areas/times with less traffic congestion.   
 Discretion can vary across different types of traffic offenses as well based on their real or 
perceived seriousness. For example, speeding may present the officer with less discretion than a 
minor vehicle defect, such as a broken rear view mirror. A stop light violation (running a red 
light) will likely involve less discretion than minor speeding in other cases. Furthermore, 
department policy may increase or decrease the level of discretion for certain types of traffic 
offenses. A department may initiate, for example, an anti-speeding campaign that mandates 
patrol officers to crack down on (all) speeding in particular areas with strict enforcement.  
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 For these reasons and likely more, there is arguably significant variation in levels of 
police discretion across different and even within similar types of traffic offenses. It is also 
possible that variable discretion is related to the racial distribution of traffic stops. More 
specifically, some have suggested that racial minorities are more likely to be stopped for 
discretionary reasons than white drivers. Although it is implied in much of the racial profiling 
literature, there have been few attempts to empirically test the assumed relationship between 
driver race and the level of discretion in traffic stops (Alpert et al. 2005; Stroshine et al. 2008).  
 Racial Bias and Discriminatory Policing 
 The discriminatory perspective, in contrast to the crime control perspective, assumes that 
race/ethnicity is a significant factor in police decision making. Proponents of this perspective 
typically argue that the police apply the law disproportionately to certain groups because of 
inherent police bias, not because those groups are disproportionately more likely to offend 
compared to other groups. This bias can manifest in different ways and at different levels of 
analysis. At the individual level, discriminatory policing can occur through officers' conscious 
racial prejudice or through a more subtle, unconscious racial bias (Smith, Makarios and Alpert 
2006). Discriminatory policing may also occur at the institutional level when laws, policies and 
practices have a disproportionately harsh effect on racial minorities.  
 A growing strand of discriminatory policing research frames racial disparities in traffic 
stops as a product of racial stereotypes and social conditioning (Smith and Alpert 2007; Warren 
et al. 2006; Welch 2007). Work drawing on racial stereotypes typically argue that minorities 
receive more police attention and harsher treatment because the police perceive them as being 
more dangerous and criminally culpable compared to whites. Unlike the overt racism of the past, 
scholars have increasingly argued that contemporary bias against minorities is largely 
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unintentional and unconscious (Welsh 2007). Smith and Alpert (2007), for example, frame racial 
stereotypes in police decisions to stop, cite and arrest drivers as a "nonmotivational but biased 
response to minority citizens by the police" (1264; emphasis added).  
 Different scholars have theorized different mechanisms for how racial stereotypes shape 
officer attitudes and influence officer behavior on the street. Smith and Alpert (2007) argue that 
unconscious racial bias is the result of stereotype formation originating from differential 
exposure to deviant groups and/or through "illusory correlation mechanisms" (1279). Differential 
exposure simply refers to the fact that police often engage with the public in largely negative 
contexts, followed by the false impression that the citizens they come into contact with represent 
all citizens of that racial group. In contrast, illusory correlation essentially refers to an 
individual's overestimation of a relationship between two classes of events, people or things 
based on preconception, not direct evidence or experience (Hamilton and Gifford 1976; Smith 
and Alpert 2007). In other words, it is the perception that two things are related when they are 
not, or the strength of the actual relationship is weaker than believed.  
 There is some evidence to suggest that illusory correlation is more likely to function in a 
top-down manner—members of a majority are more likely to attribute negative and exaggerated 
stereotypes about a minority than the other way around (Hamilton and Gifford 1976; Hamilton et 
al. 1985; Mullen and Johnson 1990). A top-down illusory correlation is consistent with a 
sociological perspective of power and social distance between the majority and minority 
populations. This social distance and differential access to power shapes interactions and 
normative expectations between police and citizens in important ways (Black 1976; Clark and 
Sykes 1975). This may be seen in policing when an officer's preconceptions about a racial 
minority's legal culpability is not based on direct, articulable evidence, but rather is based on 
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internalized stereotypes about race and crime stemming from and reinforced by larger social, 
cultural, and historical race relations.  
 The precise connections between attitudes and police behavior, however, are unclear 
(Goff and Kahn 2012). In one of the most systematic studies between officer attitudes and officer 
behavior, Worden's (1989) analysis of Police Services Study data revealed little about the 
connection between officers' self-reported attitudes and researcher-observed behaviors of officers 
on patrol. Worden's (1989) study has been critiqued on a couple different important points. One, 
officer attitudes were measured via a survey questionnaire rather than through more in-depth 
observation or interviews, limiting its ability to pick up on nuances of meanings. Two, the Police 
Services Study did not include data on racial stereotypes specifically, making it difficult to apply 
its findings to racial profiling (Goff and Kahn 2012). But while increased empirical verification 
is needed, the connection between biased attitudes about race and police behavior is still a 
plausible one (Smith and Alpert 2007; Welsh 2007).  
 Symbolic Assailants and Racialized Images of Danger 
 The term "symbolic assailant" was originally used by Jerome Skolnick (1966) to describe 
the stereotypical "other" figure that exists in the collective consciousness of the police and which 
comes to shape officer expectations on the beat. Skolnick defined the symbolic assailant as a 
"perceptual shorthand" used by patrol officers to identify classes of people they believe are 
potentially dangerous for the purposes of control and safety (45). This shorthand includes 
"gestures, language, and attire" that is associated with violence and dangerousness (1966:49). 
The symbolic assailant is also a racialized figure (Skolnick 2007). Poor, young, men of color 
have come to epitomize the symbolic assailant in the U.S.—a phenomenon sometimes referred 
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to as the "criminalblackman" (Russell-Brown 1998) and represents the widespread conflation of 
race (and age and gender) and crime in society.  
 There are several sociological reasons why young, poor, racial and ethnic minority men 
in particular fit the stereotypical image of the symbolic assailant in the eyes of the police. There 
is a deep seated  legacy of American apartheid in which politically and socially marginalized 
racial minority groups have been cast off as "dangerous classes" by the elite (Massey 1993; 
Shelden 2007). Throughout history, there has been a recurring tendency of powerful groups to 
target, punish and scapegoat segments of the population they deem different, menacing, 
threatening, inferior, dangerous (Colvin and Pauly 1983; Currie 1995). The history of drug 
prohibition in the U.S., for example, demonstrates repeated, deliberate efforts at targeting 
marginalized groups for blame of larger societal ills (Reinarman 1994).  From the opium and 
cocaine panics of the early 1900s to the harsh sentencing policies of crack cocaine in the 
contemporary war on drugs, racial minority groups and the poor have long been associated with 
images of danger and subject to disproportionate social control (Beckett, Nyrop, Pfingst, and 
Bowen 2006). 
 In the contemporary era of mass incarceration, persistent disparities between whites and 
nonwhites serving time in prison also likely contribute to the widespread stereotype that racial 
minorities are more dangerous than whites (Alexander 2010; Banks 2003). The U.S. correctional 
system—now with an estimated 7 million adult U.S. citizens currently under some form of 
correctional supervision—has undergone incredible growth over the last several decades and this 
growth has disproportionately affected racial and ethnic minorities. In 2006, greater than three 
quarters of a million Black men were in prison or jail and 2 million under some form of 
correctional supervision (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008). An estimated "1 in 3 black males, 1 in 6 
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Hispanic males and 1 in 17 white males are expected to go to prison during their lifetime” 
(Rosich 2007:17). While women represent a very small portion of those imprisoned—just under 
7% of all U.S. prisoners in 2010—women's incarceration rate has been increasing at more than 
double that of men's over the last two decades. Like minority men, minority women have seen a 
disproportionate share of these increases. In 2010, black and Hispanic women were 
approximately 3 and 1.5 times more likely, respectively, to be in prison than white women 
(Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol 2011).   
 Focal Concerns of the Police 
 Borrowing the term from Walter Miller's (1958) theory of deviance and lower class 
cultural norms, Steffensmeier (1980) developed a version of focal concerns theory to explain 
judicial decision making and sentencing disparities. Steffensmeier et al. (1998) further posited 
that judges are influenced by three primary concerns when making sentencing decisions: 
blameworthiness of the offender, protection of the community, and practical constraints. Recent 
work has proposed the application of focal concerns theory to policing to help explain officer 
decision making in the context of racial profiling (Higgins, Vito and Grossi 2012; Tillyer and 
Hartley 2010). A focal concerns approach draws upon legal and extralegal factors in criminal 
justice decision making and, along with the concept of symbolic assailants, allows the integration 
of both crime control and discriminatory perspectives of policing. 
 The first focal concern, blameworthiness, refers to the legal culpability of an offender and 
the seriousness of the harm caused by the offense. Applying this focal concern to policing in 
traffic stops, blameworthiness suggests that officers' warning, citation, search and arrest 
decisions are based on the type and seriousness of the traffic offense and driver culpability.  
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 The second concern, protection of the community, is similar to blameworthiness in that 
the seriousness of the offense and driver culpability are relevant decision making factors. But 
protection of the community also involves a prediction about an offender's future 
dangerousness/potential for violence and immediate threat to the community or innocent 
bystanders. In traffic stops, officer concerns about driver dangerousness and community safety 
likely manifest in decisions to cite, search or arrest drivers. Officers may rely on many different 
situational cues or "red flags" to predict a driver's potential dangerousness and threat to the 
community. For example, an officer may be concerned with the driver's demeanor (e.g., a 
driver's aggressive or argumentative mannerisms), the presence of bystanders (e.g., passengers in 
the vehicle), or the driver's prior contacts with the police (i.e., a pattern of offenses).  
 The third concern, practical constraints, refers to organizational and individual-level 
constraints and consequences that define the working criminal justice environment. According to 
Steffensmeier et al. (1998), these include time constraints, budget concerns, relationships with 
other criminal justice actors, and high degrees of uncertainty regarding the offender's ability to 
serve time or function in the community. In policing, time constraints and high degrees of 
uncertainty in police-public contacts are likely to have a significant impact on the officer's ability 
to fully and rationally enforce the law. This should be particularly relevant in traffic stops 
because of the limited amount of information officers have about the vehicles and drivers they 
stop, the levels of risk associated with traffic enforcement, the limited amount of time officers 
have to assess the safety of the situation and make enforcement decisions, and the inherent 
tension between an officer and a citizen in a vehicle stop (Gibson, Walker, Jennings and Miller 
2010; Sklansky 1998; Sykes and Clark 1975). Practical constraints in traffic stops may further 
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vary by what time of day the stop happened (e.g., night versus day) and how long the traffic stop 
lasted. 
 Steffensmeier et al. (1998) argued that judges develop a perceptual shorthand about 
offenders that is shaped by attributions and stereotypes of age, race and gender within the context 
of practical constraints in the courtroom. Reliance on a perceptual shorthand of guilt and 
dangerousness—the  symbolic assailant—is arguably more relevant in police work than the 
courtroom because officers have far less control over the situation, less information about 
suspects and citizens with whom they come into contact, and less time to assess the situation on 
the street than judges do in the courtroom. 
 Summary 
 The disparate findings of both literatures on police discretion and racial profiling in 
traffic stops suggest that both crime control concerns and discrimination matter in predicting 
police decisions on patrol. However, the dearth of explicit theory in racial profiling analysis has 
provided little direction for explaining and interpreting these findings. More recently, there has 
been a call for a clearer theoretical research agenda among racial profiling scholars (Engel et al. 
2002; Tillyer and Hartley 2010). A focal concerns approach (Higgins, Vito and Grossi 2012; 
Steffensmaier et al. 1998; Tillyer and Hartley 2010) coupled with the notion of  stereotypical 
images of danger and symbolic assailants (Skolnick 1966, 1995; Jones-Brown 2007)  allow the 
conceptual integration of both crime control and discriminatory perspectives of policing and 
provide a more direct theoretical framework for estimating the relative importance of legal and 
extralegal factors in traffic stop outcomes. 
60 
 
 Expectations 
 The literature outlined above has addressed the question of race and policing outcomes in 
different ways with a variety of data sources. Subsequently, the racial profiling and policing 
literatures have produced mixed results and recommendations. Recent direction in the racial 
profiling work (see Tillyer and Hartley 2010) has suggested that focal concerns and symbolic 
assailant approaches can provide useful frameworks for interpreting and explaining police 
decisions in traffic stops. Drawing on these concepts and the broader debate between crime 
control and discriminatory perspectives of policing, I expect the following relationships. 
 There is mixed evidence in the literature regarding the influence of driver race and 
ethnicity on different traffic stop outcomes (Engel and Calnon 2004; Harcourt 2004; Lundman 
and Kaufman 2003; Schafer et al. 2006; Smith and Petrocelli 2001; Warren et al. 2006; Withrow 
2006). There has also been limited examinations of driver race as it intersects with driver sex in 
traffic stop outcomes (Tillyer and Engel 2013). The discriminatory perspective and symbolic 
assailants approach predicts that race/ethnicity and gender will be significant factors in police 
decisions to warn, cite, arrest and search drivers. Therefore, 
 Hypothesis 1a: Minority drivers will experience more serious traffic stop outcomes 
compared to white drivers.  
 
 Hypothesis 1b: Minority men will experience more serious traffic stop outcomes 
compared to white men drivers and women drivers of any race or ethnicity. 
  
 The crime control perspective and focal concerns approach suggest that police decision 
making is primarily motivated by blameworthiness of suspects and potential danger in situations 
of limited knowledge, time and resources. Despite the constraints of traffic stop environments, 
which may lead to the increased risk of racial stereotyping in officer decision making, the focal 
concerns approach predicts that traffic stop outcomes will primarily be affected by legal and 
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behavioral factors associated with driver blameworthiness and danger to others, regardless of 
race/ethnicity (or gender). Therefore, 
 Hypothesis 2a: The effects of driver race and ethnicity on stop outcomes will be mediated 
by legal factors and driver behavior. 
  
 Hypothesis 2b: The effects of the interaction of driver race and sex on stop outcomes 
 will be mediated by legal factors and driver behavior. 
 
 One of the early allegations in the racial profiling debate was that the police often stop 
minority drivers based on a technical pretext (such as a minor traffic violation) in order to search 
for illicit contraband or evidence of some other, more serious crime absent any probable cause to 
do so. There is limited empirical work testing this allegation and much of the extant evidence is 
anecdotal (see Harris 2002). A focal concerns and symbolic assailants approach can provide a 
useful framework to explore the question of pretext. Driver blameworthiness associated with a 
legal traffic violation may be an important factor in police decisions to stop drivers, but 
perceptions of danger and seriousness of the violation can also be tainted by preconceptions 
about racial minorities and crime/danger. According to Steffensmeier et al. (1998), this is 
particularly true in criminal justice environments characterized by practical constraints. The 
police decision to initiate a traffic stop exemplifies this context. The decision to stop a driver for 
a relatively minor offense (e.g., a minor vehicle defect) is highly discretionary and the police 
have little to no information about a driver's personal history or potential threat before they make 
the stop, thus making the police susceptible to a perceptual shorthand of race, crime and danger 
(i.e., symbolic assailants). A focal concerns and symbolic assailants approach to pretext suggests 
that officer decisions to stop drivers are more likely to be influenced by these racial stereotypes 
of danger in stops that are discretionary compared to stops that are non-discretionary. Therefore, 
 Hypothesis 3a: Minority drivers will be more likely to be stopped for discretionary 
reasons compared to white drivers. 
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 Hypothesis 3b: Minority men will be more likely to be stopped for discretionary reasons 
compared to white men drivers and women drivers of any race/ethnicity. 
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Chapter 4 -  METHODOLOGY 
 Data 
 Data for the following analyses come from the 2008 Police Public Contact Survey 
(PPCS). The PPCS is a nationally representative, self-report survey sponsored by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics that was designed to measure citizens' face-to-face interactions with the police. 
The PPCS has been conducted a total of 5 times, with versions in 1996 (pilot), 1999, 2002, 2005 
and 2008. The survey samples all U.S. residents ages 16 and older and includes a set of questions 
asking citizens specifically about contacts with the police occurring through police-initiated 
traffic stops.   
 The PPCS is a supplement to the annual National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). 
The 2008 NCVS sample consisted of 72,566 individuals ages 16 or older (the legal driving age 
in most states). The PPCS interviewed a subset of 57,978 individuals ages 16 or older with about 
a 90 percent response rate. Of those interviewed, 38.5 percent (22,301 respondents) were 
conducted in person and 61.5 percent (35,677 respondents) by telephone. The 2008 PPCS was 
weighted to produce a national estimate of 236,511,832 persons age 16 or older (Eith and Durose 
2011). 
 Of the 57,978 respondents, 9,549 had face-to-face contact with the police in 2008. The 
possible reasons for face-to-face contact with the police included traffic related contact (driver or 
passenger in a traffic stop; driver or passenger involved in a traffic accident), contact where the 
respondent reported a problem to the police, contact where the police provided service to the 
respondent, contact related to a crime investigation, and other reasons. I restricted the sample to 
include only those respondents who were drivers stopped by the police (n=4,160). 
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 The PPCS is particularly useful for analyzing police decision making in traffic stops for a 
number of reasons. First, it marks the only nationally representative data set that measures 
police-citizen contact in traffic stops. Most racial profiling studies rely on official police-
collected data and are limited to the particular characteristics unique to the jurisdiction of the 
agency collecting the data. Second, the PPCS includes a detailed set of questions on a number of 
legal and extralegal factors that are pertinent to police focal concerns and symbolic assailants in 
police-citizen contacts. The PPCS includes data on a number of driver, officer, community, and 
situational characteristics of traffic stops. Third, the PPCS collects data on a number of 
meaningful police enforcement outcomes in traffic stops, including warnings, citations, arrests, 
and searches. The survey's skip patterns in the questionnaire also produce a complex mix of 
discreet and multiple outcomes for each traffic stop, which more likely approximates the 
complex mix of possibilities in real-world traffic enforcement.  
 Dependent Measures 
 Traffic Stop Outcomes 
  The PPCS asked drivers stopped by the police about the outcome(s) of their most recent 
traffic stop. I focus on five primary stop outcomes in the PPCS: warning, citation, arrest, search, 
and no outcome beyond the stop. Each of these are presented as dichotomous yes or no questions 
in the survey questionnaire (e.g., "During this contact were you given a warning?"). Drivers who 
were warned in a traffic stop could report they received either a written or verbal warning. 
Drivers who were searched could report whether the police asked for permission to conduct the 
search and whether they gave the officer consent to search. As mentioned earlier, these outcomes 
are not mutually exclusive in practice. For example, a driver can be ticketed, arrested, and 
searched in a single stop. The PPCS allows for this complexity, and with the exception of 
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warnings and citations (i.e., a driver cannot report both a warning and a citation in a traffic stop), 
respondents could report more than one stop outcome. Figure 4.1 graphically displays the 
overlapping nature of traffic stop outcomes as measured by the PPCS. 
Figure 4.1 - Universe of Possible Traffic Stop Outcomes, PPCS 2008 
 
 Estimating the important factors associated with stop outcomes becomes more complex 
when there is significant overlap between outcomes. To my knowledge, no prior research using 
PPCS data has accounted for the possibility of multi-outcome traffic stops. Rather, prior research 
has treated various outcomes as discreet possibilities (for example Engel and Calnon 2004, 
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Lundman and Kaufman 2003; Gilliard-Matthews et al. 2008). I address the complicated nature of 
traffic stop outcomes by identifying a total of 12 possible mutually exclusive outcomes (Table 
4.1). 
Table 4-1 Possible stop outcomes following survey skip patterns 
 Traffic Stop Outcome, 2008 PPCS (n=4160) 
   1. No outcome 
   2. Warning only 
   3. Citation only 
   4. Arrest only 
   5. Search only 
   6. Arrest and warning only 
   7. Arrest and citation only 
   8. Search and warning only 
   9. Search and citation only 
 10. Search and arrest only 
 11. Search and warning and arrest 
 12. Search and citation and arrest 
  
 
These categories were constructed by following the PPCS questionnaire skip patterns. Some of 
these outcomes are highly unlikely and arguably contradictory in practice. For example, an 
arrest and a warning in the same stop is not a plausible outcome. Additionally, some of the 
categories are somewhat redundant and some had too few observations to run valid inferential 
statistics. Of the 12 possible categories, 7 had observations in the data: no outcome beyond the 
stop (n=670); citation only (n=2206); verbal or written warning only (n=1110); arrest only 
(n=26); ticket and search (n=61); warning and search (n=16); arrest and search (n=71).  
 To make the dependent variable more empirically and theoretically meaningful, I recoded 
these 7 categories into 4 mutually exclusive outcome categories (see Table 4.2).  
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Table 4-2 Mutually exclusive stop outcomes, 2008 PPCS 
Outcome Category Total n=4160 
1. Warning only/no outcome 1780 
2. Citation only 2206 
3. Search and warning/search and citation 77 
4. Arrest only/arrest and search 97 
 
 
Of the 4,160 drivers stopped: 1) 1,780 drivers reported receiving a warning only (verbal or 
outcome) or no other outcome; 2) 2,206 drivers reported receiving a citation only; 3) 77 drivers 
reported either being searched and warned only or searched and cited only; and 4) 97 drivers 
reported being arrested only or arrested and searched. This distribution is also more theoretically 
meaningful as well. There is a logical progression of seriousness/intrusiveness in the recoded 
outcome categories, where a warning or no other outcome is the least intrusive outcome and an 
arrest plus a search is the most serious and intrusive. In the analyses that follow, stops that result 
in a warning or no other outcome is the reference category. This allows a more intuitive, and 
direct comparison between more serious (i.e., citations, searches, and arrests) and less serious 
(i.e., warnings and no other police action) stop outcomes. 
 Two outcome categories  now contain drivers who reported being searched. However, 
there is an important distinction between searches that occur with an arrest and searches that do 
not. Distinguishing between different types of search outcomes is one of the advantages of 
analyzing multi-outcome versus discreet outcome traffic stops. This is particularly useful for 
searches because searches that occur without an arrest should differ in terms of officer discretion 
compared to searches that occur with an arrest. 
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 Searches that do not occur with an arrest indicate the likelihood that the search was 
conducted because of the officer's (unfounded) suspicions and perceptions about the driver's 
dangerousness and/or culpability. This outcome has important implications for the symbolic 
assailants hypothesis, which predicts that driver's race (and sex) affect officer perceptions of 
danger and culpability. Both a focal concerns and a symbolic assailants approach further imply 
that officers are more likely to act on these perceptions in highly discretionary contexts (Tillyer 
and Hartley 2010).  
 The level of officer discretion in searches that occur with an arrest is more limited 
compared to searches without an arrest for a couple reasons. The temporal sequence of events in 
this case is important—searches may be conducted before or after an arrest, and each sequence 
has important implications for officer discretion and the focal concerns/crime control hypotheses. 
In the 2008 PPCS, about 56 percent of searches were conducted before an arrest and 44 percent 
after an arrest.  Searches that are conducted before an arrest increase the likelihood that the 
search turned up illegal evidence, thus giving the officer probable cause (blameworthiness) to 
make an arrest. The 2008 PPCS indicates that the police found illegal items in roughly 30 
percent of searches conducted before an arrest (author calculation).  
 Searches that are conducted after an arrest increase the likelihood that the search was 
mandated by department policy. After an arrest is made many departments mandate that their 
officers conduct searches of vehicles and drivers to ensure the officer's safety from potential 
weapons, and to collect an inventory of the arrested driver's property (Withrow 2006). Therefore, 
searches that occur both before or after an arrest indicate limited officer discretion and increased 
driver blameworthiness compared to searches that occur before an arrest. 
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 Discretionary Stops 
 There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that the police sometimes use minor, 
discretionary traffic stops as a pretext to act on suspicions that drivers are involved in more 
serious crime (Harris 2002; Withrow 2006; Whren v. United States 1996). The pretext hypothesis 
also suggests this practice is disproportionately used against racial minorities, particularly black 
and Hispanic motorists. To test this hypothesis, I analyze the relationship between driver 
characteristics with the reason for the traffic stop. There are eight mutually exclusive reasons for 
traffic stops in the 2008 PPCS: speeding; vehicle defects; record check; drunk driver check lane; 
turn signal and lane change violation; stop sign/light violation; and other miscellaneous offenses. 
Because of the idiosyncratic and unpredictable nature of traffic stops for miscellaneous offenses, 
I removed them from analysis of Hypothesis 3.  
Table 4-3 Reason for traffic stopᵃ, 2008 PPCS 
 Total n=3648 
1. Speeding 2046 
2. Drunk driver check lane 88 
3. Stop sign/light violation  348 
4. Turning or lane violation  272 
5. Record check 262 
6. Vehicle defect 466 
7. Seatbelt violation 166 
ᵃMisc. traffic offenses dropped from analysis  
 
 Theoretically speaking, all traffic stops are discretionary—there is some degree of choice 
involved in every stop an officer makes. However, certain types of stops are arguably more 
discretionary than others. For example, a stop for a minor vehicle defect is clearly more 
discretionary than a stop that occurs in a drunk driver check lane. Often, a vehicle defect is 
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ambiguous and minor, including things such as a burnt out license plate lamp, a broken/loud 
muffler, or a cracked rear view mirror. Likewise, because of the high maintenance requirements 
of automobiles, vehicle defects, minor or otherwise, are also quite common (Harris 1999). The 
ubiquitous and minor nature of defects introduces more officer choice and more selective 
enforcement in traffic stops involving vehicle defects. Record checks, too, are typically more 
discretionary than many other reasons for traffic stops. Stops for record checks are often 
conducted by officers on the basis of a suspicion that the driver is culpable for a more serious 
crime, such as a arrest warrant or a stolen vehicle (Harris 2002). In contrast, check lanes for 
drunk drivers are mandatory—they require by law or policy that officers stop every car travelling 
through the designated area (Samaha 2005). Conservatively speaking, other traffic violations 
such as speeding and stop sign/light violations have the potential to be more dangerous and 
arguably decrease (compared to stops based on vehicle defects and record checks) the degree of 
officer choice in making the stop. 
 
Table 4.4 Discretionary Stops, 2008 PPCS 
Stop Category Total n=3648 
1. Non-discretionary stopª 2754 
2. Discretionary stopᵇ 894 
ᵃIncludes speeding, drunk driver check lane, stop sign/light and turning/lane violations 
ᵇIncludes vehicle defects, record checks, and seatbelt violations 
 
 To test the assertion that the police are more likely to stop minority drivers for 
discretionary reasons compared to white drivers, I differentiate between stops for traffic offenses 
that the literature has suggested tend to be more discretionary and stops that tend to be less 
discretionary (See Table 4.4). I construct a dichotomous reason for the stop variable that 
distinguishes between discretionary and non-discretionary stops where discretionary reasons=1 
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and non-discretionary reasons=0.  Traffic stops for vehicle defects, record checks and seatbelt 
violations are coded in the discretionary category (n=894), and stops for speeding, drunk driver 
check lanes, stop sign or stop light violations, and turning or lane violations are coded in the non-
discretionary category (n=2754).  
 Independent Measures 
 The PPCS contains a number of legal and extralegal factors that could possibly influence 
officer behaviors in traffic stop encounters with citizens. The theoretical framework above 
predicts that racialized and gendered notions of symbolic assailants will shape police decision 
making so that driver race and sex will significantly shape traffic stop outcomes. At the same 
time, the theoretical framework predicts that focal concern measures of blameworthiness and 
dangerousness ought to have the strongest effect on stop outcomes and mediate the effect of 
driver race and sex. In addition to driver characteristics and focal concern measures, I also 
identify several possible control variables that may also correlate with officer behavior in traffic 
stops.  
 Driver Characteristics 
 There are several demographic characteristics of drivers captured in the PPCS relevant to 
the concept of symbolic assailants, including driver race, ethnicity, sex, age, and class. The 
sociohistorical conflation of race (and gender) and crime indicates that the most salient 
characteristics of symbolic assailants will be driver race and sex. I measure driver's sex as 
female=1 and male=0. I use four dichotomous measures of driver race and ethnicity so that 
black, non-Hispanic=1, else=0; Hispanic=1, else=0; and other (includes Asian, Pacific Islander, 
Eskimo, American Indian, more than one race, and non-specified race not of Hispanic 
descent)=1, else=0. White, non-Hispanic drivers are the excluded reference category. Driver's 
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age is measured as a continuous variable beginning at age 16. The only measure of social class in 
the 2008 PPCS is employment status. Driver's employment status is measured as a dichotomous 
variable where employed=1 and not employed=0. 
 Few studies of racial profiling have looked at the intersection of driver race and sex. To 
explore the interaction effects of driver race and sex in traffic stops, I create eight additional 
dichotomous, interaction terms for driver race and sex combined. These categories include white 
men, white women, black women, black women, Hispanic men, Hispanic women, other men, 
and other women. White men is the excluded reference category.  
 Focal Concern Measures 
  Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer (1998) argued that focal concerns of blameworthiness 
and protection of the community are based on the seriousness and associated harm of an offense, 
as well as a prediction about potential dangerousness of an offender. Blameworthiness and 
perceptions of dangerousness is not as straight forward in traffic stop decisions as it is via 
sentencing decisions in the courtroom. I argue that blameworthiness in a traffic stop will be most 
associated with the alleged traffic violation leading to the stop and that predictions about 
dangerousness in a traffic stop will be most influenced by the driver's demeanor and deference 
toward the officer. Traffic stops for more serious reasons should be more likely to lead to an 
official sanction (citation or arrest) compared to stops for less serious reasons. Likewise, drivers 
who are more aggressive and show less deference to the officer should be more likely to 
experience a citation, arrest or a search compared to drivers who are more compliant. 
 Blameworthiness 
 The PPCS measures data on the traffic offense by asking drivers to report the reason for 
the stop as told to them by the officer. The available reasons include speeding, vehicle defect, 
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record check, drunk driver roadside check lane, seatbelt violation, turn or lane change violation, 
stop sign or stop light violation, or some other unlisted reason. Each of these reasons are 
mutually exclusive in the PPCS—drivers cannot report more than one reason for a traffic stop. I 
construct dichotomous variables for each of the reason categories (yes=1, else=0). Speeding is 
the excluded reference category for stop outcome models. 
 In addition to their most recent contact with the police, the PPCS asks respondents to list 
the total number of prior face-to-face contacts they had with the police in the previous year. This 
variable is a continuous measure in numbers of prior face-to-face contacts. Some have argued 
that the number of prior contacts may be a proxy indicator for unmeasured driver characteristics 
which make them more likely to have negative experiences with the police (see Lundman and 
Kaufman 2003). I use the number of prior contacts as an indicator for blameworthiness for two 
reasons. First, the greater the number of prior contacts increases the likelihood that the driver has 
police records on file when they are stopped. Prior records, traffic or otherwise, may signal to the 
officer a perception of driver culpability (Lundman and Kaufman 2003). Second, the number of 
prior contacts may indicate a pattern in offending (traffic or otherwise) that is associated with the 
driver's blameworthiness when stopped by the police. 
 Dangerousness 
 I use two measures dangerousness of the driver from the PPCS: driver demeanor and the 
presence of vehicle passengers. Much previous research has shown (e.g., Smith and Visher 1981) 
driver demeanor to be an important behavioral factor that shapes police perceptions of a citizen's 
potential dangerousness. Driver demeanor in traffic stops, however, has been largely neglected in 
the empirical literature on racial profiling (Withrow 2006). Respondents to the 2008 PPCS can 
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report whether they (the driver) argued, cursed, or verbally threatened the officer. Demeanor is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, where 1=argued, cursed, or threatened the officer. 
 Second, the 2008 PPCS allows respondents to indicated whether they had passengers in 
the vehicle when they were stopped. Having passengers in a vehicle during a traffic stop can 
affect perceptions of danger to the community in a couple of ways. One, if passengers include 
minors or young children, then the traffic offense may pose an immediate threat to those 
innocent bystanders in the vehicle. Second, if the vehicle is occupied by a group of what the 
police perceive to be symbolic assailants (e.g., a group of adolescents of color), then the police 
may perceive the occupants as "up to no good" and a potential threat to the community and the 
officer (Pilivian and Briar 1968). While the PPCS does not collect data on the age, race or sex of 
the passengers, it does ask respondents how many passengers were in the vehicle during the stop. 
Having passengers in the vehicle during a traffic stop is measured in the analysis below as a 
dichotomous variable where yes=1, no=0.  
 Practical constraints 
 Practical constraints limit the ability of officers to make fully informed, rational decisions 
based on legal, crime control factors alone. Traffic stops by their nature pose a fair amount of 
constraints on an officer's rational decision making (e.g., limited information about drivers, 
limited visibility inside vehicles, limited time to assess the seriousness of the situation, risk of 
surrounding traffic), and some specific factors may increase or decrease those constraints. I use 
two measures of practical constraints relevant to traffic stops: the time of day when the stop 
occurred and the length of the stop in time. First, the time of day of the stop is measured as a 
dichotomous variable that distinguishes between nighttime stops and daytime stops 
(nighttime=1; daytime=0). I argue that nighttime stops pose more constraints than daytime stops 
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because of the limited visibility at night. Second, the length of the stop is measured as a 
continuous variable in minutes ranging from 1 to 200 minutes. I argue that the shorter the stop in 
minutes, the greater the constraints on officer decision making. In contrast, the longer the stop in 
minutes, the more time the officer has to assess the situation and gather legally relevant 
information on the driver.  
 Control Factors 
 The 2008 PPCS includes data on several additional factors that the literature has 
suggested may be important to stop outcomes, including community characteristics, officer 
characteristics, situational characteristics of the stop, and other controls. The 2008 PPCS asks 
drivers about the race of the officer(s) who stopped them and how many officers were involved 
in the stop. Drivers can specify officers as black, white or another race.  I construct three 
dichotomous variables where white officer(s)=1, else=0; black officer(s)=1, else=0; and officers 
of another race =1, else=0. White officers is the excluded reference category. The number of 
officers involved in the stop is measured as a dichotomous variable where more than one 
officer=1 and only one officer=0. 
 The 2008 PPCS estimates a general size of place measure referred to as a core-based 
statistical area (CBSA). Drivers are matched with one of three categories of residence: in a 
CBSA and in the principal city; in a CBSA but not in the principal city; and not in a CBSA.  
From this measure, I construct three dichotomous variables for each of these categories. CBSA, 
in the principal city is the excluded reference category. In addition to CBSA status, the 2008 
PPCS collects info on whether the traffic stop took place where the driver lives. Respondents can 
specify if the stop took place in their city/town/village of residence, in a city/town/village but not 
their residence, or not in a city/town/village. I construct three dichotomous measures for each 
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residence category. Stops that occur in a city/town/village but not the driver's residence is the 
excluded reference category. 
 Finally, the PPCS asks respondents how often they drive. I code three dichotomous 
measures of driving frequency: drivers who report driving every day; drivers who report driving 
a few days a week; and drivers who report driving either a few days a month, a few times a year, 
or almost never. Drivers who report driving almost every day is the excluded reference category.  
 Analysis 
 I use multinomial logistic regression to examine relative importance of legal and 
extralegal factors in stop outcomes and binary logistic regression to analyze the factors 
associated with the reason for the stop. Analyses of traffic stop outcomes using binary logistic 
regression techniques have been increasingly employed in recent research (for examples see 
Engel and Calnon 2004; Gilliard-Matthews et al. 2008; Lundman and Kaufman 2003; Lundman 
2004; Worrall 2006). Binary regression techniques allow estimation of the likelihood of some 
event that has only two possible outcomes (i.e., happened or did not happen) and are useful in the 
analysis of discrete traffic stop outcomes (Pampel 2000). 
 Multinomial logit is an appropriate technique for categorical variables as well, but unlike 
binary logistic regression it allows for estimation of dependent variables with more than two 
categories. This technique is a good fit for traffic stop analysis because police are routinely 
confronted with multiple decisions in initiating, investigating and resolving traffic stops. Because 
multiple outcomes are possible in a traffic stop, multinomial logistic regression can provide a 
more nuanced framework of trends in traffic stop data than binary logistic models.  
 Ordered probit analysis also considers multiple-category dependent variables. Unlike 
multinomial logit, however, ordered probit assumes that dependent variable categories are 
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inherently rank ordered.  Traffic stop outcomes are arguably rank ordered in terms 
intrusiveness/seriousness.  For example, drivers who only receive a verbal warning in a stop for 
speeding experience less police intrusion than drivers who are searched in a stop for speeding.  
What makes this assumption problematic for the ordered probit technique, however, is that it is 
not clear if degrees of intrusiveness change uniformly across outcome categories. In other words, 
is the step up in the effect of legal, extralegal and control factors between receiving a warning 
and receiving a citation the same as the step up in the effect of those factors between receiving a 
citation and being arrested? Intuitively, it makes sense that a warning is less intrusive/serious 
than an arrest. What is not clear is how much more intrusive/serious an arrest is over a warning, 
nor if the effects of the independent variables vary in degrees between outcome categories. For 
these reasons, I limit my analyses to non-ordered multinomial logistic models of stop outcomes. 
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Chapter 5 -  FINDINGS 
 Descriptive statistics for all measures are reported in Table 5.1. A citation only was the 
most common reported stop outcome (54%), followed by a warning only or no reported outcome 
(41%), an arrest only or an arrest and a search in the same stop (3%), and finally searches with 
either a ticket or a warning in the same stop, but no arrest (1%). This pattern is consistent with 
previous literature which consistently finds that more serious outcomes (e.g., searches and 
arrests) also tend to be the most infrequent traffic stop outcomes (Engel and Calnon 2004; 
Lundman 2004). For the discretionary stops model, drivers who reported being stopped for a 
discretionary reason (i.e., a vehicle defect, record check, or seatbelt violation) made up 25 
percent of the sample compared to 75 percent who reported being stopped for a non-
discretionary reason (i.e., drunk driver check lane, speeding, stop sign/light or turning/lane 
violation).  
 Women made up 42 percent of drivers stopped by the police and the average age of 
stopped drivers was roughly 41 years. White drivers made up 76 percent of the sample (44% 
white men; 32% white women), black drivers 9 percent (5% black men; 4% black women), 
Hispanic drivers 11 percent (7% Hispanic men; 4% Hispanic women) and drivers of "other" 
races/ethnicities 4 percent (3% men of other races; 1% women of other races).  
 The most common reason for a traffic stop was speeding (52%). The average number of 
prior police contacts in the previous 12 months reported by stopped drivers was 1.36. The 
average length of the stop was 11.83 minutes long. 31 percent of stopped drivers reported being 
stopped at night and 30 percent reported having passengers in the vehicle at the time of the stop. 
Only 1 percent of stopped drivers reported arguing, cursing, insulting, or verbally threatening the 
police. 
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 This research is primarily interested in how driver race and sex, particularly the 
intersection of race and sex, affects police decisions to investigate and resolve traffic stops. For 
stop outcomes, hypothesis 1a predicts that minority drivers will have a greater likelihood than 
white drivers of being cited, arrested, and searched in traffic stops as opposed to being warned or 
reporting no outcome. Hypothesis 2a predicts that focal concerns measures will mediate the 
(independent) effects of driver race and sex on traffic stop outcomes. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present 
bivariate analyses between driver characteristics and stop outcome categories. Tables 5.4 through 
5.6 present the results of six multinomial logistic regression models testing Hypotheses 1a and 
2a. Tables 5.7 through 5.9 present the results of six multinomial logistics models testing 
Hypothesis 1b and 2b, which include interactions terms for driver race and sex. Finally, 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that minority drivers will be more likely to be stopped for discretionary 
reasons compared to white drivers and Hypothesis 3b predicts that minority men drivers will be 
more likely to be stopped for more discretionary reasons compared to white men drivers and 
women drivers of any race/ethnicity. Table 5.10 presents the results of 3 binary logistic 
regression models testing these hypotheses. 
Table 5-1 Descriptive Statistics, Police Public Contact Survey, 2008 (n=4160) 
Measures Min Max Mean Std 
Dev 
Officer Action     
 Stop Outcome 0 3 .64 .64 
  -Warning only/no outcome (reference) 0 1 .43 .49 
  -Citation only 0 1 .53 .50 
  -Search and combo 0 1 .02 .13 
  -Arrest and combo 0 1 .02 .15 
Reason for Stop (n=3648)ᵃ     
  -Discretionary 0 1 .25 .41 
Driver Characteristics     
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  Female 0 1 .42 .49 
  Male (reference) 0 1 .58 .49 
  White (reference) 0 1 .76 .43 
  Black 0 1 .09 .28 
  Hispanic 0 1 .11 .31 
  Other 0 1 .04 .20 
  Age 16 90 40.68 15.39 
  Employed 0 1 .79 .41 
  Intersection of Driver Race & Sex     
   White men (reference) 0 1 .43 .50 
   White women 0 1 .33 .47 
   Black men 0 1 .05 .21 
   Black women 0 1 .04 .20 
   Hispanic men 0 1 .06 .25 
   Hispanic women 0 1 .05 .20 
   Other men 0 1 .02 .17 
   Other women 0 1 .02 .12 
Focal Concerns     
 Blameworthiness     
  Speeding (reference) 0 1 .52 .49 
  Vehicle defect 0 1 .11 .32 
  Record check 0 1 .06 .24 
  Drunk driver check lane 0 1 .02 .14 
  Seatbelt violation 0 1 .04 .19 
  Illegal turn/lane violation 0 1 .07 .25 
  Stop light/sign 0 1 .09 .28 
  Other traffic offense 0 1 .09 .29 
 Dangerousness     
  # of prior contacts 1 15 1.36 1.04 
  Driver argued/threatened  police 0 1 .01 .11 
  Passengers in vehicle 0 1 .30 .46 
 Practical Constraints     
  Length of stop in minutes 1 200 11.83 11.28 
  Stopped at night 0 1 .31 .46 
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Controls     
  Drives almost every day (reference) 0 1 .91 .29 
  Drives few times a week 0 1 .07 .25 
  Drives few times a month/yr 0 1 .02 .12 
  Single officer (reference) 0 1 .85 .36 
  Multiple officers 0 1 .15 .35 
  White officer (reference) 0 1 .84 .37 
  Black officer 0 1 .05 .21 
  Other race officer 0 1 .11 .24 
  CBSA, principal city (reference) 0 1 .27 .44 
  CBSA, not principal city 0 1 .60 .49 
  Not in CBSA 0 1 .13 .33 
  Resident where stopped 0 1 .52 .50 
  Not a resident where stopped 
_(reference) 
0 1 .33 .47 
  Not stopped in city/town 0 1 .15 .35 
ᵃAnalysis of discretionary stops was restricted to a 
smaller population of stopped drivers due to the 
exclusion of stops for miscellaneous violations 
    
 
 Stop Outcomes 
 To explore the relationship between stop outcomes and race/ethnicity, I began by running 
bivariate correlations of select driver characteristics and stop outcomes. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 
present the zero order correlation matrices for driver race/ethnicity, driver sex, and the four 
mutually exclusive stop outcome categories (see Table 4.2 and corresponding discussion for a 
more in-depth explanation of these categories). Table 5.2 presents race and sex independent from 
one another and Table 5.3 includes the interaction terms for driver race and sex. There are 
several findings of note in these bivariate analyses. Consistent with hypothesis one, findings 
from Table 5.2 show that minority drivers are more likely to be positively associated with more 
serious stop outcomes and that white drivers are more likely to be positively associated with less 
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serious outcomes (i.e., warnings only or no other outcome). Black drivers were positively 
associated with stops resulting in a search or an arrest as the most severe outcome and Hispanic 
drivers were positively associated with stops resulting in a citation only, as were drivers of other 
races/ethnicities. In contrast, black, Hispanic and drivers of other races were all negatively 
associated with stops resulting in a warning or no other outcome. Contrary to the assumption in 
hypothesis one, however, Hispanic and drivers of other races were not positively associated with 
stops resulting in searches or arrests, the most serious stop outcomes. Women drivers were 
positively related to less serious outcomes and negatively related to more serious outcomes, 
including searches and arrests. Men were the exact opposite (not shown in table). 
Table 5-2 Correlation Matrix: Stop Outcomes, Driver Race and Sex (n=4160) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Warn .43 .49 1.00         
2. Cite .53 .50 -.92* 1.00        
3. Search .02 .13 -.12* -.15* 1.00       
4. Arrest .02 .15 -.13* -.16* -.02 1.00      
5. Female .44 .50 .03* .01 -.09* -.06* 1.00     
6. White .76 .43 .10* -.08 -.06* -.02 -.002 1.00    
7. Black .09 .29 -.04* .01 .07* .04* .01 -.56* 1.00   
8. Hisp .11 .31 -.06* .05* .03 .002 -.01 -.61* -.11* 1.00  
9. Other .04 .20 -.06* .07* -.003 -.02 .01 -.37* -.07* -.07* 1.00 
*p<.05 | two-tailed test  
 
 Table 5.3 presents some interesting changes to those findings reported in Table 5.2. 
White women drivers were the only group of women to retain the positive relationship with stops 
resulting in warnings/no other outcome (Hispanic women were even negatively related to 
warnings). Likewise, white women were the only group of women drivers to remain negatively 
associated with stops resulting in more serious outcome categories. Black and Hispanic women 
were positively associated with stops resulting in a citation only, but did not show any significant 
relationship with searches or arrests. Both black and Hispanic men were positively associated 
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with experiencing a search and both white and black men drivers were positively associated with 
stops resulting in an arrest. 
 Table 5-3 Correlation Matrix: Stop Outcomes, Race and Sex Interaction (n=4160) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.Warn  
 
.43 .49 1.00            
2. Cite 
 
.53 .50 -.92* 1.00           
3. Search 
 
.02 .13 -.12* -.15* 1.00          
4. Arrest 
 
.02 .15 -.13* -.16* -.02 1.00         
5. White 
female 
.33 .47 .08* -.04* -.08* -.05* 1.00        
6. White 
male 
.43 .49 .02 -.03* .02 .03* -.60* 1.00       
7. Black 
female 
.04 .20 -.03 .03* -.01 <.01 -.15* -.18* 1.00      
8. Black 
male 
.05 .22 -.02 -.02 .10* .05* -.16* -.20* -.05* 1.00     
9. Hisp 
female 
.05 .21 -.05* .06* -.02 -.01 -.15* -.19* -.05* -.05* 1.00    
10. Hisp 
male 
.06 .24 -.04* .02 .05* .01 -.18* -.22* -.05* -.06* -.06* 1.00   
11. Other 
female 
.02 .20 -.01 .02 -.01 -.02 -.10* -.12* -.02 -.03* -.03* -.04* 1.00  
12. Other 
male 
.02 .15 -.07* .07* .003 -.003 -.11* -.13* -.03* -.04* -.03* -.04* -.02 1.00 
*p<.05 | two-tailed test     
 
 From the bivariate results we begin to get a sense of how race and stop outcomes might 
be connected, as well as how the intersection of race and sex might change the nature of that 
connection. But this is only part of the story. Multivariate analyses are needed to better isolate 
the independent effects of race/ethnicity, sex and gender on stop outcomes and in light of 
controls and other theoretically relevant factors. Table 5.4 presents the results from the first and 
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second multinomial logistic regression models. Model 1 contains control factors only. These are 
common factors that have been linked to police decision making in previous literature (Harris 
2002; Withrow 2006), but are not included as independent measures of the theoretical framework 
I outlined above. 
 In the first multinomial model, driving frequency significantly affected all stop outcomes. 
Drivers who report driving a few days a week are significantly less likely than drivers who report 
driving everyday to be cited rather than warned only or report no other traffic stop outcome 
(hereafter referred to simply as "warned"). Drivers who report driving much less, from a few 
days a month to just a few times a year to almost never, are significantly more likely to be 
searched and arrested rather than warned in stops compared to those who report driving every 
day.  
 The race of officers significantly affected stops resulting in citations and searches, but not 
stops involving an arrest. Specifically, black officers and officers of "other" races are 
significantly more likely to cite rather than warn drivers than are white officers, and officers of 
other races are also more likely than white officers to search rather than just warn drivers. When 
there is more than one officer present during a traffic stop, the stop is more likely to end in 
citations, searches or arrests than a warning only. 
 A few community factors significantly affected stop outcomes. Drivers who reside in a 
CBSA but not in the principal city, and drivers who do not reside in a CBSA, are less likely than 
drivers who reside in a principal city CBSA to receive a citation versus a warning. CBSA status 
indicates where a driver lives, not necessarily where the stop occurred. To account for this 
discrepancy, the PPCS also asks drivers if the stop happened in  the city/town where they live. 
Stops that occurred in a driver's home town/city, and stops that did not occur in a town/city at all 
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(e.g, rural areas or highways not in a city), are significantly less likely than stops that occur in the 
city/town where a driver lives to garner a citation versus a warning.  
 In all, these community characteristic findings suggests that, all else being equal, a driver 
is more likely to receive a citation versus a warning when they are away from home and in a 
large city. No community characteristics were significantly related to being arrested versus 
getting a warning, and only drivers not living in a CBSA were significantly less likely to be 
searched rather than warned compared to drivers living in a principal city CBSA. 
 
Table 5-4 Multinomial Logistic, Models 1 & 2. Controls and Driver Characteristics. Beta 
Coefficients and Odds Ratios Reported (N=4,160). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Citation v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Search v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Arrest v. Warning 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
      
Controls       
  Dr few days week -.368(.692)** -.337(.714)* .329(1.389) .550(1.733) -.474(.622) -.409(.664) 
  Dr few days m/yr -.056(.946) -.119(.888) 1.922(6.838)** 1.424(4.152)** 1.100(3.003)* .733(2.082) 
  Multiple officers -.670(.512)** -.732(.481)** 1.153(3.167)** .756(2.129)** 1.412(4.104)** 1.231(3.423)** 
  Black officer(s) .447(1.564)** .398(1.489)* -.218(.804) -.703(.495) .478(1.613) .304(1.355) 
  Othr race off(s) .326(1.385)* .312(1.366)* .912(2.490)** 1.057(2.877)** .250(1.284) .324(1.383) 
  CBSA, n.p. -.255(.775)** -.182(.833)* -.202(.817) .088(1.092) -.345(.708) -.213(.808) 
  Not in CBSA -.786(.456)** -.713(.490)** -.776(.460)* -.514(.598) -.457(.633) -.367(.693) 
  Resident w/stp -.328(.720)** -.340(.712)** .180(1.197) .264(1.302) -.347(.707) -.331(.718) 
  Not stp in city -.215(.807)* -.229(.795)* .294(1.342) .314(1.369) -.450(.637) -.465(.628) 
Driver       
  Female — -.083(.920) — -1.961(.141)** — -.969(.379)** 
  Black — .249(1.282)* — 1.365(3.916)** — .585(1.796) 
  Hispanic — .371(1.449)** — .421(1.523) — .000(1.000) 
  Other race — .717(2.048)** — .459(1.582) — .371(.690) 
  Age — -.011(.989)** — -.070(.932)** — -.036(.965)** 
  Employed — -.117(.889) — -.415(.660) — -.433(.648) 
 Model 1  Model 2    
Model χ² 290.058** 477.399**     
Pseudo R² .082 .132     
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*p<.05 | **p<.01       
 
 Model 2 features the addition of driver characteristics. Net of controls, the race and sex of 
drivers significantly affected stop outcomes. Women's likelihood of being cited versus warned 
was not significantly different than men's, but women were significantly less likely than men to 
be searched or arrested in a traffic stop compared to warned. 
 There were significant disparities between minority drivers and white drivers for all stop 
outcomes, though the effects were not the same for all minority drivers, nor were the effects the 
same for all outcomes. Black drivers, for example, were significantly more likely than white 
drivers to be cited and searched compared to warned, but not arrested compared to warned. 
Hispanic drivers were significantly more likely than white drivers to be cited rather than warned, 
but not searched or arrested compared to warned. Likewise, drivers of other races were 
significantly more likely to be cited rather than warned compared to white drivers, but not 
significantly different than white drivers in their chances of being searched or arrested versus 
warned. In addition to race and sex, driver age also had significant effects on stop outcomes. As 
driver age increases, the likelihood of being cited, searched or arrested versus warned decreases.  
 Hypothesis 1a predicted that minority drivers would be more likely than white drivers to 
experience more serious traffic stop outcomes. The findings in Model 2 provide mixed support 
for this hypothesis. Minority drivers were significantly more likely to be cited compared to 
warned, but not significantly more likely to be arrested versus warned compared to white drivers. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, black drivers were nearly 4 times as likely as white drivers to be 
searched versus warned only, net of control factors. Hispanic drivers and drivers of other races, 
however, were no more likely than white drivers to be searched or arrested compared to warned.  
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 Table 5.5 presents the results of Models 3 and 4, which contains the first two sets of focal 
concerns measures in addition to driver characteristics and controls. Model 3 features the 
addition of driver blameworthiness measured by the legal reason for the traffic stop. Possible 
reasons for the stop include speeding, vehicle defects, record checks, drunk driver check lanes, 
seatbelt violations, turning and lane violations, stop sign and stop light violations, and other, 
miscellaneous traffic offenses; speeding is the reference category. Model 4 features the addition 
of safety and dangerousness measures. This set of focal concerns is operationalized by the 
number of the driver's prior police contacts (other than the present traffic stop), the driver's 
demeanor (i.e., driver argued, cursed, or threatened the police), and the presence of bystanders as 
passengers in the vehicle being stopped. 
 In Model 3, all reasons for the stop (with the exception of seatbelt violations) were 
significantly less likely to result in a citation versus a warning compared to speeding. Seatbelt 
violations were no more or less likely than speed limit violations to result in a citation versus a 
warning. Traffic stops for drunk driver roadside checks had the lowest likelihood of resulting in a 
citation versus a warning. This makes sense since most who go through a roadside check lane are 
not being stopped because they broke a traffic law. Rather, check lanes are typically designed to 
stop everyone who comes through a particular area, not because of individual suspicion, but 
because of a general suspicion that drunk drivers are travelling through that area at that time. 
Traffic stops for miscellaneous offenses were significantly more likely than stops for speeding to 
result in an arrest rather than a warning. No other reason for the stop was significantly related to 
being searched or arrested versus warned. This may be expected because so few stops lead to a 
search or an arrest compared to citations and warnings in the first place. 
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Table 5-5 Multinomial Logit. Stop Outcomes, Models 3 & 4. Blameworthiness and 
Safety/Dangerousness Measures. Betas and Odds Ratios Reported (N=4,160). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Citation v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Search v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Arrest v. Warning 
Variables Model 3  Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 
 
Model 4 
      
Controls       
  Drives week -.30(.74)* -.30(.74)* .52(1.67) .56(1.75) -.42(.66) -.42(.66) 
  Drives m/yr -.14(.87) -.14(.87) 1.46(4.29)** 1.41(4.11)** .62(1.86) .66(1.93) 
  Multiple off. -.43(.65)** -.40(.67)** .91(2.48)** .87(2.39)** 1.31(3.69)** 1.26(3.51)** 
  Black off. .39(1.48)* .38(1.46)* -.75(.47) -.68(.51) .28(1.32) .37(.1.44) 
  Oth race off. .36(1.4)* .37(1.45)* 1.08(2.95)** 1.08(2.95)** .36(1.44) .37(1.44) 
  CBSA, n.p. -.20(.82)* -.20(.82)* .14(1.15) .13(1.14) -.21(.81) -.19(.83) 
  Not in CBSA -.74(.48)** -.74(.48)** -.43(.65) -.47(.63) -.31(.73) -.34(.71) 
  Resident  -.21(.83)** -.19(.82)* .27(1.30) .30(1.36) -.39(.68) -.37(.69) 
  Not stp in city -.17(.84) -.16(.85) .30(1.35) .31(1.37) -.51(.60) -.51(.60) 
Driver       
  Female -.15(.86)* -.16(.85)* -1.95(.14)** -1.94(.14)** -.98(.38)** -.94(.39)** 
  Black .31(1.36)* .32(1.38)* 1.31(3.69)** 1.26(3.53)** .62(1.86)* .58(1.78) 
  Hispanic .49(1.63)** .49(1.63)** .38(1.46) .38(1.47) .05(1.05) .09(1.09) 
  Other race .69(1.99)** .68(1.97)** .46(1.58) .46(1.59) -.37(.69) -.42(.66) 
  Age -.01(.99)** -.01(.99)** -.07(.93)** -.07(.93)** -.04(.96)** -.036(.96)** 
  Employed -.16(.85) -.14(.87) -.47(.63) -.46(.63) -.48(.62) -.48(.62) 
Focal Concerns       
  Defect -1.42(.24)** -1.41(.24)** .20(1.22) .25(1.28) -.14(.87) -.10(.90) 
  Record chk -1.87(.15)** -1.85(.16)** -.65(.52) -.61(.54) -.87(.42) -.85(.43) 
  Drunk dr chk -2.25(.11)** -2.27(.10)** -1.48(.23) -1.47(.23) .34(1.41) .39(1.48) 
  Seatbelt .25(1.29) .25(1.29) .65(1.91) .62(1.85) .38(1.46) .39(1.47) 
  Turn/lane  -.58(.56)** -.60(.55)** .13(1.14) .11(1.11) .69(2.01) .66(1.94) 
  Stp sign/light -.42(.66)** -.45(.64)** -.27(.76) -.29(.75) -.16(.85) -.14(.87) 
  Other offense -1.02(.36)** -1.04(.36)** -.21(.81) -.17(.84) .81(2.25)** .85(2.33)** 
  # of contacts — -.13(.88)** — -.01(.99) — .07(1.07) 
  Demeanor — 1.55(4.73)** — 2.70(14.94)** — 2.94(18.89)** 
  Passengers — .094(1.10) — .23(1.26) — -.074(.93) 
 Model 3  Model 4    
Model χ² 874.252** 919.327**     
Pseudo R² .231 .242     
*p<.05 | **p<.01       
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 Hypothesis 2a predicts that focal concern factors will mediate any race and sex 
differences in the likelihoods of experiencing more serious stop outcomes. If focal concern 
measures mediate race and sex, the relative strength of driver race and sex  on stop outcomes 
should decrease after accounting for focal concern measures. The results of Model 3 show mixed 
support for this hypothesis. Women, for example, became significantly less likely than men to 
receive a citation versus a warning in Model 3. In Model 2, before including the reason for the 
stop, women were not significantly different from men in their chances of being cited versus 
warned. Additionally, except for drivers of "other" races, adding reasons for the stop affected the 
strength of driver race and ethnicity on citations. Coefficients for black and Hispanic drivers 
became larger for citations versus warnings, though the direction and overall significance did not 
change. This suggests that blameworthiness as measured by the traffic offense/reason for the stop 
does not mediate the effects of driver race and sex on citations compared to warnings.  
 In support of Hypothesis 2a, the strength of the relationship between black drivers being 
searched instead of warned only compared to white drivers became weaker after adding reasons 
for the stop in Model 3. This suggests that at least part of effect for black drivers' greater 
likelihood of being searched versus warned in a traffic stop is being mediated by the reason they 
are stopped. In contrast, after accounting for reason for the stop, black drivers became 
significantly more likely than white drivers to be arrested rather than warned. Before including 
reasons for the stop, there were no significant differences in black drivers' and white drivers' 
odds of being arrested versus warned. 
 Model 4 includes focal concerns of safety and dangerousness. This set of focal concerns 
are measured by the number of a driver's prior contacts with the police, the presence of 
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bystanders/passengers in the vehicle at the time of the stop, and the driver's demeanor toward the 
officer(s) measured as arguing, cursing or threatening the police. The number of prior contacts 
with the police was significantly related driver's likelihood of being cited versus warned—as the 
number of prior contacts increases, the likelihood of receiving a citation versus a warning is 
reduced by about 12 percent. The number of prior contacts with the police was not significantly 
related to the likelihood of being searched or arrested versus warned. Furthermore, having 
passengers in the vehicle did not significantly affect the driver's likelihood of being cited, 
searched or arrested compared to warned.  
 Driver demeanor was strongly related to the driver's likelihood of experiencing a more 
serious traffic stop outcome. Driver demeanor is measured dichotomously by whether the driver 
argued, cursed, or verbally threatened the officer during the stop. Drivers who reported arguing, 
cursing or threatening the police were about 4.7 times more likely to be cited compared to 
warned, 14.9 times more likely to be searched compared to warned, and 18.9 times more likely 
to be arrested compared to warned than drivers who did not argue, curse, or verbally threaten the 
police. 
 Hypothesis 2a predicts that the effects of measures of blameworthiness and 
safety/dangerousness will mediate the effects of driver race and ethnicity. The effects of driver 
race and ethnicity on citations versus warnings were minimal between Models 3 and 4 when 
accounting for the reason for the stop. The coefficients for Hispanic and other race drivers got 
smaller in Model 4, but the change was negligible and the direction and overall significance did 
not change. The coefficient for black drivers who were cited got larger between Model 3 and 4—
though again, the overall strength of this change was small and did not change in direction or 
significance.  
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 The effects of safety/dangerousness measures, particularly driver demeanor, on the 
effects of driver race/ethnicity were more pronounced for stops resulting in searches and arrests 
versus warnings than citations versus warnings. Black drivers were 3.69 times more likely than 
white drivers to be searched versus warned in Model 3, but 3.53 times as likely in Model 4. More 
importantly, the significance of driver race effects dropped out between Models 3 and 4 for black 
drivers reporting an arrest compared to a warning. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, the effects of 
race for black drivers appears to be mediated by focal concern measures of safety and 
dangerousness for stops resulting in an arrest versus a warning. The addition of both sets of focal 
concerns measuring blameworthiness and safety/dangerousness had little impact on the effects of 
driver age, employment or control factors.  
 Table 5.6 presents the results of Model 5 and 6, which adds two measures of practical 
constraints in traffic stops. The first constraint, stops that occur at night, is featured in Model 5 
while the second constraint, the length of the traffic stop in minutes, is introduced in Model 6. I 
separate these measures between Models because of the predicted direction of the effects each 
should have on stop outcomes. Steffensmeier et al. (1998) argue that practical constraints, 
limited time and information, increase the likelihood that criminal justice actors rely on 
racialized stereotypes when making decisions. Stops at night and the time length of the stop are 
reasonable measures of practical constraints in traffic stops. Stops at night should increase the 
effect of driver race on serious stop outcomes. In contrast, the longer the stop the effect of race 
on stop outcomes should decrease. To better isolate the independent effects of each measure on 
the effects of driver race and ethnicity, I introduce them one at a time in separate models. 
 In Model 5, drivers who were stopped at night were significantly less likely to receive a 
citation and significantly more likely to be arrested versus warned or no other outcome compared 
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to drivers stopped during day time. Stops at night were not significantly related to searches. 
Adding this variable had no significant impact on the effects of driver race and ethnicity. Adding 
stops at night did, however, increase the strength of the effect of driver demeanor on citations 
and slightly reduced the strength of the effect of driver demeanor on arrest.  
Table 5-6  Multinomial Logit. Stop Outcomes, Models 5 & 6.  Practical Constraints. Beta 
Coefficients and Odds Ratios Reported (N=4,160). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Citation v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Search v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Arrest v. Warning 
Variables Model 5  Model 6 Model 5 Model 6 Model 5 
 
Model 6 
      
Controls       
  Drives week -.283(.753)* -.272(.762) .55(1.73) .469(1.598) -.42(.66) -.54(.58) 
  Drives m/yr -.101(.904) -.257(.77) 1.43(4.19)** 1.346(3.843)* .596(1.816) .56(1.74) 
  Multiple off. -.352(.70)** -.40(.67)** .87(2.39)** .523(1.688) 1.20(3.33)** .82(2.26)** 
  Black off. .360(1.433)* .29(1.34) -.649(.52) -.411(.663) .412(1.510) .57(1.77) 
  Oth race off. .36(1.44)* .40(1.49)* 1.07(2.93)** 1.23(3.41)** .323(1.382) .312(1.366) 
  CBSA, n.p. -.219(.80)** -.20(.819)* .125(1.133) .252(1.286) -.168(.845) .081(.922) 
  Not in CBSA -.734(.48)** -.70(.495)** -.466(.627) -.286(.751) -.388(.678) -.423(.655) 
  Resident -.193(.82)* -.18(.837)* .288(1.333) .511(1.667) -.428(.652) -.278(.757) 
  Not stp in city -.17(.85) -.088(.916) .276(1.318) .709(2.032) -.519(.595) .011(1.011) 
Driver       
  Female -.211(.81)** -.15(.86)* -1.94(.14)** -1.82(.16)** -.87(.42)** -.57(.57)* 
  Black .36(1.44)** .270(1.31)* 1.26(3.52)** 1.06(2.89)** .567(1.76) .472(1.60) 
  Hispanic .47(1.60)** .42(1.52) .39(1.48) .37(1.45) .12(1.12) .028(1.03) 
  Other race .69(1.99)** .65(1.92) .44(1.55) .54(1.71) -.51(.60) -1.09(.34) 
  Age -.02(.99)** -.01(.99)** -.07(.93)** -.07(.94)** -.03(.97)** -.03(.97)** 
  Employed -.12(.89) -.09(.91) -.46(.64) -.39(.68) -.51(.60)* -.42(.66) 
Focal Concerns       
Blameworthiness       
  Defect -1.24(.29)** -1.33(.27)** .27(1.31) -.14(.87) -.21(.81) -.59(.55) 
  Record chk -1.88(.15)** -1.86(.16)** -.59(.55) -.47(.63) -.77(.46) -1.26(.28) 
  Drunk dr chk -2.06(.13)** -1.89(.15)** -1.44(.24) -.84(.43) .23(1.26) .62(1.87) 
  Seatbelt .14(1.155) .16(1.17) .65(1.91) .94(2.56) .69(1.995) 1.00(2.73) 
  Turn/lane -.55(.58)** -.63(.54)** .11(1.11) .01(1.01) .58(1.79) .66(1.93) 
  Sign/light -.37(.69)** -.36(.68)** -.27(.76) -.16(.86) -.18(.84) -.07(.93) 
  Other offense -.98(.37)** -1.00(.37)** -.15(.86) -.43(.65) .79(2.21)* .59(1.795) 
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  # of contacts -.12(.89)** -.16(.86)** -.01(.99) -.10(.90) .07(1.07) -.027(.97) 
Dangerousness       
  Demeanor 1.62(5.06)** 1.32(3.76)** 2.67(14.39)** 2.06(7.82)** 2.83(16.95)** 2.35(10.49)** 
  Passengers .12(1.12) .071(1.07) .20(1.22) -.058(.94) -.15(.86) -.26(.77) 
Constraints       
  Stp at night -.68(.50)** -.77(.47)** -.03(.97) -.27(.76) .89(2.44)** .63(1.88)* 
  Length of stp — .09(1.10)** — .15(1.16)** — .15(1.16)** 
 Model 5  Model 6    
Model χ² 1025** 1510**     
Pseudo R²  .266 .379     
*p<.05 | **p<.01       
 
 The coefficient for black drivers increased after adding stops at night into the model for 
citations versus warnings and increased in significance from the p<.05 to the p<.01 level. 
However, adding in stops at night decreased the coefficients for black drivers in searches and 
arrests and for all stop outcomes for Hispanic and other race drivers. While the significance did 
not change, the strength of female drivers' likelihoods of being cited, searched and arrested 
versus warned compared to men decreased after adding stops at night to the model. 
 Table 5.6 also contains the result of Model 6, which includes all independent factors with 
the inclusion of the length of the stop. The practical constraints of criminal justice decisions, 
according to Steffensmeier's (1998) focal concerns theory, limit criminal justice actors ability to 
make fully rational decisions. This increases the influence of stereotypes and preconceptions 
about race and crime. The police are limited by both time and information constraints, requiring 
them to make decisions on the fly as "street level bureaucrats" (Mastrofski 2004).  While traffic 
stops are inherently more time limited than courtrooms, for example, focal concerns theory as 
described above suggests that the shorter the stop, the less time an officer has to make a fully 
informed, rational decision. This should increase the influence of driver race on officer decisions. 
The longer the stop, the less the effect of race on stop outcomes. The length of the stop in Model 
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6 was  significant and positively related to stop outcomes. The longer the stop, the higher the 
likelihood that the driver was cited, searched, arrested compared to being just warned. In 
addition to significant and positive effects, adding the length of the stop to the model also 
reduced in strength the effects of driver race on stop outcomes. 
 The Interaction of Race and Sex in Stop Outcomes 
 Hypothesis 1b and 2b assess the relationship between the interaction of race and sex on 
stop outcomes. Tables 5.7 through 5.9 present the results of multinomial models replicating the 
stop outcome models above but with interaction terms for driver race and sex combined. Table 
5.7 presents the results of Models 7 and 8. Model 7 includes control factors only (same controls 
as Model 1 above), and driver characteristics with race and sex interaction terms are included in 
Model 8. 
Table 5-7 Multinomial Logit. Stop Outcomes, Models 7 & 8. Controls and Driver 
Characteristics, Race & Sex Interactions. Beta Coefficients and Odds Ratios Reported 
(N=4,160). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Citation v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Search v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Arrest v. Warning 
Variables Model 7  Model 8 Model 7 Model 8 Model 7 
 
Model 8 
      
Controls       
  Drives week -.368(.692)* -.337(.714)* .329(1.389) .550(1.733) -.474(.622) -.409(.664) 
  Drives m/yr -.056(.946) -.119(.888) 1.922(6.838)** 1.424(4.152)** 1.100(3.003)* .733(2.082) 
  Multiple officers -.670(.512)** -.732(.481)** 1.153(3.167)** .756(2.129)** 1.412(4.104)** 1.231(3.423)** 
  Black officer(s) .447(1.564)** .398(1.489)* -.218(.804) -.703(.495) .478(1.613) .304(1.355) 
  Other officer(s) .326(1.385)* .312(1.366)* .912(2.490)** 1.057(2.877)** .250(1.284) .324(1.383) 
  CBSA, n.p. -.255(.775)** -.182(.833)* -.202(.817) .088(1.092) -.345(.708) -.213(.808) 
  Not in CBSA -.786(.456)** -.713(.490)** -.776(.460)* -.514(.598) -.457(.633) -.367(.693) 
  Resident -.328(.720)** -.340(.712)** .180(1.197) .264(1.302) -.347(.707) -.331(.718) 
  Not stp in city -.215(.807)* -.229(.795)* .294(1.342) .314(1.369) -.450(.637) -.465(.628) 
Driver       
  Wht female — -.132(.876) — -1.941(.144)** — -.954(.385)** 
  Blk male — .050(1.051) — 1.335(3.799)** — .558(1.747) 
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  Blk female — .342(1.408)* — -.861(.423) — -.441(.643) 
  Hisp male — .233(1.250) — .340(1.405) — -.161(.851) 
  Hisp female — .442(1.556)** — -1.519(.219) — -.602(.548) 
  Other male — 1.037(2.819)** — .398(1.489) — .155(1.168) 
  Other female — .291(1.337) — -.490(.613) — n/aᵃ 
  Age — -.011(.989)** — -.071(.932)** — -.036(.965)** 
  Employed — -.119(.888) — -.411(.663) — -.422(.656) 
 Model 7  Model 8    
Model χ² 290.058** 489.576**     
Pseudo R² .082 .135     
*p<.05 | **p<.01 | ᵃNot enough data      
 
 In Model 2 above, which considered race and sex separately, women drivers' likelihood 
of being cited versus warned were no different than men's. However, after the inclusion of race 
and sex interaction terms, significant differences emerged between men's and women's 
likelihoods of being cited rather than warned. White women and other race women are no more 
likely to receive a citation versus a warning compared to white men, but black women, Hispanic 
women, and other race men are all significantly more likely to receive a citations versus a 
warning compared to white men. For citations, age and all other controls retained similar effects 
between race and sex interaction and non-interaction models. Furthermore, while women were 
significantly less likely than men to be searched and arrested versus warned in Model 2, only 
white women drivers were significantly less likely to experience a search or arrest compared to 
men in Model 8. Likewise, though black drivers were significantly more likely to be searched 
rather than warned compared to white drivers in Model 2, only black men are significantly more 
likely to be searched compared to white men. 
 Hypothesis 1b predicts that minority men will be significantly more likely to experience 
more serious traffic stop outcome compared to white men drivers or women of any 
race/ethnicity. Model 8 presents mixed support for this hypothesis. Contradictory to the 
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hypothesis, black and Hispanic women were more significantly more likely to experience a 
citation versus a warning compared to white men, as were men of "other" races/ethnicities. For 
searches, only black men, not Hispanic or other men, were more likely to experience a more 
serious outcome compared to white men drivers. For arrests, while white women were 
significantly less likely than white men to be arrested versus warned, black men, Hispanic men, 
and men of other races were not significantly more likely to experience an arrest versus a 
warning. This finding is contrary to what was expected in Hypothesis 1b. 
Table 5-8 Multinomial Logit. Stop Outcomes, Models 9 & 10.Blameworthiness and 
Dangerousness, Race & Sex Interactions. Beta Coefficients and Odds Ratios Reported 
(n=4,160). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Citation v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Search v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Arrest v. Warning 
Variables Model 9  Model 10 Model 9 Model 10 Model 9 
 
Model 10 
      
 Controls       
  Drives week -.301(.74)* -.30(.74)* .52(1.67) .56(1.75) -.419(.66) -.421(.66) 
  Drives m/yr -.14(.87) -.14(.867) 1.46(4.29)** 1.41(4.11)** .62(1.86) .66(1.93) 
  Mult officers -.43(.65)** -.40(.67)** .91(2.48)** .87(2.39)** 1.31(3.69)** 1.26(3.51)** 
  Blk officer(s) .39(1.48)* .38(1.46)* -.751(.47) -.68(.51) .28(1.316) .37(.1.44) 
  Othr off(s) .36(1.44)* .37(1.45)* 1.08(2.95)** 1.08(2.94)** .36(1.44) .37(1.44) 
  CBSA, n.p. -.19(.82)* -.20(.82)* .14(1.15) .13(1.14) -.208(.81) -.188(.83) 
  Not in CBSA -.74(.48)** -.74(.48)** -.43(.65) -.47(.63) -.310(.73) -.344(.71) 
  Resident  -.21(.81)** -.19(.82)* .27(1.30) .30(1.36) -.39(.68) -.37(.69) 
  Not stp in city -.17(.84) -.16(.85) .30(1.35) .31(1.37) -.51(.60) -.51(.60) 
Driver       
  Wht female -.19(.83)* -.21(.82)** -1.95(.14)** -1.97(.14)** -.94(.39)** -.91(.41)** 
  Blk male .13(1.14) .12(1.12) 1.28(3.61)** 1.21(3.35)** .61(1.83) .52(1.69) 
  Blk female .32(1.38) .34(1.41) -.91(.40) -.88(.41) -.41(.67) -.37(.69) 
  Hisp male .34(1.41)* .34(1.40)* .29(1.34) .29(1.34) -.078(.93) -.04(.96) 
  Hisp female .50(1.65)** .49(1.63)** -1.47(.23) -1.49(.23) -.63(.53) -.57(.56) 
  Other male 1.12(3.07)** 1.12(3.07)** .44(1.56) .47(1.60) .22(1.25) .31(1.36) 
  Other female .11(1.11) .05(1.05) -.46(.63) -.61(.55) n/aᵃ n/aᵃ 
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  Age -.011(.99)** -.01(.99)** -.07(.93)** -.07(.93)** -.04(.96)** -.04(.97)** 
  Employed -.16(.85) -.15(.86) -.46(.63) -.46(.63) -.47(.63) -.47(.63) 
Focal Concerns       
Blameworthy       
  Defect -1.42(.24)** -1.41(.24)** .22(1.25) .25(1.28) -.14(.87) -.10(.90) 
  Record chk -1.88(.15)** -1.87(.16)** -.63(.53) -.61(.54) -.87(.42) -.85(.43) 
  Drunk dr chk -2.27(.10)** -2.29(.10)** -1.47(.23) -1.47(.23) .32(1.37) .37(1.44) 
  Seatbelt .25(1.28) .25(1.28) .65(1.91) .62(1.85) .37(1.45) .39(1.47) 
  Turn/lane  -.59(.55)** -.61(.54)** .12(1.13) .11(1.11) .69(1.99) .65(1.92) 
  Stp sign/light -.43(.65)** -.46(.63)** -.27(.77) -.29(.75) -.17(.84) -.16(.85) 
  Other offense -1.02(.36)** -1.04(.35)** -.19(.82) -.17(.84) .81(2.24)** .86(2.35)** 
  # of contacts — -.13(.88)** — -.01(.99) — .07(1.07) 
Dangerousness       
  Demeanor — 1.59(4.93)** — 2.70(14.94)** — 3.02(20.42)** 
  Passengers — .09(1.10) — .23(1.26) — -.07(.94) 
 Model 9  Model 10    
Model χ² 887.514** 934.047**     
Pseudo R² .234 .245     
*p<.05 | **p<.01  | ᵃNot enough data      
 
 Table 5.8 presents the results of Models 9 and 10, which introduce measures for 
blameworthiness and safety/dangerousness for race and sex interaction terms. Like Model 8 
compared to Model 2, the relative strength, direction, and significance of the theoretical and 
control factors remained the same in Models 9 and 10 compared to Models 3 and 4. Compared to 
speeding, all other reasons for the traffic stop (except seatbelt violations) were significantly less 
likely to result in citations versus warnings in Models 9 and 10. Driver demeanor, too, continued 
to be the strongest single predictor of citations, searches and arrests compared to warnings and 
no other outcome. The differences between models lie primarily in the race and sex interaction 
terms. 
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 Hypothesis 2b predicts that the interaction effects for driver race and sex will be mediated 
by focal concerns of blameworthiness and dangerousness. The results of Models 9 and 10 show 
mixed support for this hypothesis. Most notably, white women drivers became significantly less 
likely than white men to be cited versus warned and black women drivers became no more likely 
than white men to be cited versus warned. This suggests that black women's likelihood of being 
cited versus warned is explained by the reason for the stop. In addition, Hispanic men became 
significantly more likely than white men to be searched compared to warned. Hispanic women 
and other race men continued to be significantly more likely than white men to be cited versus 
searched after reason for the stop was introduced. Likewise, white women continued to be 
significantly less likely than white men to be searched and arrested versus warned and black men 
remained significantly more likely to be searched versus warned compared to white men 
drivers—although the strength of these relationships were weakened slightly after introducing 
reason for the stop. 
Table 5-9 Multinomial Logit. Stop Outcomes, Models 11 & 12.  Practical Constraints, Race & 
Sex Interactions. Beta Coefficients and Odds Ratios Reported (n=4,160). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Citation v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Search v. Warning 
b(O.R.) 
Arrest v. Warning 
Variables Model 11  Model 12 Model 11 Model 12 Model 11 
 
Model 12 
      
Controls       
  Drives week -.28(.75)* -.28(.76) .55(1.73) .47(1.60) -.42(.66) -.54(.58) 
  Drives m/yr -.08(.90) -.24(.78) 1.43(4.19)** 1.35(3.84)* .59(1.82) .56(1.74) 
  Mult officer(s) -.35(.70)** -.41(.67)** .87(2.40)** .52(1.69) 1.20(3.33)** .82(2.26)** 
  Blk officer(s) .36(1.44)* .29(1.34) -.65(.52) -.41(.66) .41(1.51) .57(1.77) 
  Othr race officer(s) .35(1.42)* .38(1.47)* 1.07(2.93)** 1.23(3.41)** .32(1.38) .31(1.37) 
  CBSA, n.p. -.22(.81)** -.20(.82)* .13(1.13) .25(1.29) -.17(.85) .08(.92) 
  Not in CBSA -.74(.48)** -.71(.49)** -.47(.63) -.29(.75) -.39(.68) -.42(.65) 
  Resident -.19(.83)* -.17(.84)* .29(1.33) .51(1.67) -.43(.65) -.28(.76) 
  Not stp in city -.17(.85) -.09(.91) .28(1.32) .71(2.03) -.52(.59) .01(1.01) 
Driver       
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  Wht female -.26(.77)** -.22(.81)** -1.97(.14)** -1.79(.17)** -.81(.45)** -.46(.63) 
  Blk male .12(1.13) -.08(.92) 1.20(3.31)** .89(2.42)* -.30(.74) .31(1.37) 
  Blk female .38(1.46)** .45(1.56)* -.87(.42) -.78(.46) .51(1.67) .07(1.07) 
  Hisp male .32(1.38)* .29(1.33) .30(1.36) .37(1.45) .01(1.01) .14(1.15) 
  Hisp female .42(1.53)* .37(1.45)* -1.47(.23) -1.97(.14) -.51(.60) -.85(.43) 
  Other male 1.2(3.2)** 1.06(2.87)** .45(1.56) .53(1.69) .28(1.32) -.26(.78) 
  Other fem -.01(.99) .09(1.09) -.63(.53) -.15(.87) n/aᵃ n/aᵃ 
  Age -.01(.99)** -.01(.99)** -.07(.93)** -.07(.93)** -.03(.97)** -.03(.97)** 
  Employed -.12(.89) -.10(.90) -.46(.63) -.40(.67) -.49(.61) -.42(.66) 
Focal Concerns       
Blameworthiness       
 Defect -1.24(.29)** -1.33(.27)** .27(1.31) -.14(.87) -.21(.81) -.59(.55) 
 Record check -1.89(.15)** -1.87(.16)** -.59(.55) -.47(.63) -.77(.46) -1.26(.28) 
 Drunk dr check -2.08(.13)** -1.92(.15)** -1.44(.24) -.84(.43) .23(1.26) .62(1.87) 
 Seatbelt .14(1.15) .15(1.16) .65(1.91) .94(2.56) .69(1.99) 1.00(2.73) 
 Turn/lane -.56(.57)** -.63(.53)** .11(1.11) .01(1.01) .58(1.79) .66(1.93) 
 Sign/light -.38(.68)** -.37(.69)** -.27(.76) -.16(.86) -.18(.84) -.07(.93) 
 Other offense -.99(.37)** -1.01(.37)** -.15(.86) -.43(.65) .79(2.21)* .59(1.80) 
Dangerousness       
 # of contacts -.12(.89)** -.16(.86)** -.01(.99) -.10(.91) .07(1.07) -.03(.98) 
 Demeanor 1.62(5.32)** 1.37(3.95)** 2.64(14.06)** 2.02(7.53)** 2.93(18.70)** 2.43(11.32)** 
 Passengers .12(1.12) .071(1.074) .20(1.22) -.06(.94) -.14(.87) -.27(.77) 
Constraints       
 Stp at night -.69(.50)** -.78(.46)** -.03(.97) -.25(.78) .89(2.44)** .64(1.90)* 
 Length of stp — .10(1.10)** — .15(1.16)** — .15(1.16)** 
 Model 11  Model 12    
Model χ² 1041** 1528**     
Pseudo R²  .271 .382     
*p<.05 | **p<.01  | ᵃNot enough data      
 
 Table 5.9 presents the results of Models 11 and 12, which includes practical constraint 
measures. As with the non-intersectionality models, stops at night were significantly less likely 
than stops during the day to result in a citation versus a warning, and significantly more likely to 
result in an arrest versus a warning compared to stops during the day. The length of the stop was 
likewise associated with greater likelihoods of stops resulting in citations, searches and arrests 
100 
 
compared to warnings. With the exception of driver characteristics, the introduction of both 
practical constraint measures did not significantly change the strength, direction, or significance 
of other theoretical and control factors.  
 The effects of practical constraints on driver race and sex effects were more complicated, 
particularly for stops resulting in citations only. Black women became significantly more likely 
than white men to be cited rather than warned after practical constraint measures were 
introduced. Hispanic women remained significantly more likely to be cited than white men, but 
the strength of this relationship was weakened and its significance dropped from the p<.01 to the 
p<.05 level. White women remained significantly less likely than white men to be cited rather 
than warned and the strength of the this relationship increased slightly after introducing stops at 
night.  
  The strength of all the effects of race-sex groups on stop outcomes decreased after 
introducing the length of the traffic stop in Model 12. Hispanic men became no more likely than 
white men to be cited versus warned after accounting for the length of the stop. Black men's 
greater likelihood of being searched versus warned compared to white men remained significant, 
but decreased in slightly in strength. The length of the stop also decreased the strength of the 
relationship between white women's chances of being searched versus warned compared to white 
men. Furthermore, white women became no more or less likely than white men to be arrested 
versus warned after introducing length of the stop.  
 Discretionary Stops 
 There is some literature that suggests that police are more likely to use minor traffic 
violations as a pretext to stop and investigate minority drivers, particularly black and Hispanic 
drivers, for more serious offenses (Harris 2002; Withrow 2006). There has been limited 
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empirical analysis of the pretext hypothesis, however. I use data from the PPCS to categorize 
stops as either discretionary or non-discretionary based on the reason for the stop. Hypothesis 3a 
predicts that minority drivers are more likely than white drivers to be stopped for discretionary 
reasons. Hypothesis 3b predicts that minority men drivers are more likely than white men drivers 
and women drivers of any race/ethnicity to  be stopped for discretionary reasons. To test these 
hypotheses, I analyzed the racial and ethnic (and sex) patterns in the reasons for traffic stops, 
controlling for other situational and contextual factors using binary logistic regression. Table 
5.10 presents the results of three logistic regression models testing the effects of driver 
characteristics and important control factors on the likelihood of drivers being stopped for more 
discretionary reasons compared to less discretionary reasons. 
Table 5-10 Logistic Regression. Discretionary Stops, Models 1, 2 & 3. Controls and Driver 
Characteristics. Beta Coefficients and Odds Ratios Reported (N=3,482). 
 
b(O.R.) 
Discretionary Stops 
 
 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Control Factors      
  Drives few times a week  .319(1.376)* .386(1.471)* .363(1.437)*  
  Drives few times a m/yr  .358(1.431) .257(1.293) .193(1.212)  
  Black officer  -.283(.753) -.416(.660) -.327(.721)  
  Other race officer  -.219(.803) -.286(.751) -.234(.792)  
  CBSA, not principal city  -.039(.962) .039(1.040) .063(1.065)  
  Not in CBSA  .366(1.442)** .464(1.590)** .458(1.580)**  
  Resident where stopped  .609(1.839)** .610(1.841)** .595(1.812)**  
  Not stopped in city/town  .252(1.287) .263(1.300) .248(1.282)  
  Passengers  -.055(.947). -.057(.945) .587(.949)  
  Stopped at night  .799(2.223)** .761(2.140)** .763(2.144)**  
Driver Characteristics      
  Female  — -.355(.701)** —  
  Black  — .562(1.755)** —  
  Hispanic  — .431(1.538)** —  
  Other race  — -.391(.677) —  
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  Age  — -.003(.997) —  
  Employed  — -.070(.933) —  
Race-Sex Interaction      
  Wht female  — — -.161(.851)  
  Blk male  — — .668(1.949)**  
  Blk female  — — .144(1.155)  
  Hisp male  — — .629(1.877)**  
  Hisp female  — — -.016(.984)  
  Other race male  — — -.108(.898)  
  Other race female  — — -1.013(.363)**  
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
-2 Log Likelihood  3419.988 3384.570 3378.678  
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke)  .066 .081 .084  
*p<.05 | **p<.01       
 
 In Model 1, few control factors had significant independent effects on the likelihood of 
being stopped for a discretionary reason. Drivers who report driving a no more than a few days a 
week were significantly more likely than drivers who report driving everyday to be stopped for 
more discretionary reasons. Black officers and officers of other races were no more or less likely 
than white officers to stop drivers for more discretionary reasons. Drivers who do not live in a 
CBSA were more likely to be stopped for a discretionary reasons compared to those who do live 
in a CBSA. On the other hand, drivers were more likely to be stopped for a discretionary reason 
in the city/town where they live than were drivers stopped where they do not live. Drivers were 
also more likely to be stopped for a discretionary reason when stopped at night compared to 
being stopped during the day. Because a vehicle defect can  include a broken or burned out 
headlight/taillight, this may explain the higher likelihood of being stopped for a discretionary 
reason at night—it is an easy vehicle defect for officers to notice and therefore presents the 
officer with articulable evidence to support the stop. 
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 Model 2 introduced driver characteristics in addition to control factors from Model 1. The 
effects of control factors on discretionary stops remained virtually unchanged from Model 1 to 
Model 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, however, there were significant driver race effects on 
the likelihood of being stopped for a discretionary reason. Hispanic and black drivers were both 
significantly more likely to be stopped for discretionary reasons compared to white drivers. 
Drivers of other races were no more or less likely than white drivers to be stopped for a 
discretionary reason. Driver sex had a significant impact on the reason for the stop—women 
drives were significantly less likely than men drivers to be stopped for a discretionary reason. 
Interestingly, driver age did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of experiencing a more 
discretionary stop, despite driver age being significantly related to the likelihood receiving more 
serious stop outcomes as detailed in the previous analyses above. Driver employment did not 
have a significant impact on the reason for the stop as well.  
 Model 3 introduced interaction terms for driver race and sex. As with stop outcomes, the 
independent effects of race and sex on discretionary stops are made more complex when 
considering the intersection of race and sex together. While black and Hispanic drivers were 
more likely to be stopped for a discretionary reason compared to white drivers in Model 2, this 
was only true for black and Hispanic men in Model 3. Black and Hispanic women drivers were 
no more likely than white men drivers to be stopped for a discretionary reason, and neither were 
white women drivers for that matter. Women drivers of  "other" races, however, were 
significantly less likely than white men drivers to be stopped for more discretionary reasons. 
Control factors, as between Models 1 and 2, remained largely unchanged between Models 2 and 
3. 
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 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Race and ethnicity is a lightning rod in American criminal justice. The controversy over 
police racial profiling in routine traffic stops is just one recent manifestation of racial conflict in 
a deeply-rooted history of racial conflict and inequality in the U.S. Racial profiling in vehicle 
stops and the "driving-while-black" phenomenon gained national attention in the 1990s 
following two high profile cases alleging widespread race-based stops along major interstates in 
New Jersey and Maryland  (Lamberth 1996). Following these cases, empirical research on racial 
and ethnic disparity in vehicle stops quickened. Despite rapid growth, the profiling literature 
remains young in terms of its theoretical development and research methodology. This 
dissertation has attempted to partially address some of these gaps in the extant literature by: a) 
framing the hypotheses and analysis in an explicit theoretical model based on the concepts of 
police focal concerns and symbolic assailants; b) modeling for a number of pertinent control and 
independent variables relevant to both crime control and discrimination perspectives of racial 
disparity in traffic stops; c) utilizing a more nuanced operationalization of traffic stop outcomes 
that accounts for multiple outcomes in one stop; d) quantitatively exploring the question of race, 
police discretion and pretextual vehicle stops; and e) further exploring the intersectional effects 
of driver race/ethnicity and sex in traffic stops and stop outcomes. 
 There are several key findings of note pertinent to these goals. First, there were 
significant independent effects of driver race/ethnicity and sex on the likelihood of experiencing 
more serious outcomes compared to less serious outcomes. Second, the strength of the effects of 
driver race/ethnicity and sex on traffic stop outcomes were weakened, in general, with the 
introduction of focal concern measures. Third, select focal concern measures had the strongest 
independent effects on stop outcomes. Fourth, driver race/ethnicity and sex had significant 
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independent effects on the likelihood of being stopped for discretionary reasons. Fifth, including 
intersectionality measures for driver race and sex complicates the effect of race (and gender) in 
traffic stops.  
 Race and Stop Outcomes 
 Following a symbolic assailants/discriminatory perspective, hypothesis one predicts that 
race/ethnicity will have a significant effect on stop outcomes. Specifically, it predicts that racial 
and ethnic minority drivers will be more likely than white drivers to experience more serious 
stop outcomes. The findings reported Table 5.4 show partial support for this hypothesis. Black, 
Hispanic and drivers of other races/ethnicities were all significantly more likely than white 
drivers to be cited versus warned after stopped by the police. On the other hand, only black 
drivers were more likely than white drivers to be searched versus warned and there were no 
significant differences by race/ethnicity for stops resulting in arrests versus warnings. These 
findings suggest that, net certain control factors, race/ethnicity matters in police decisions to 
resolve a traffic stop, but that race/ethnicity matters less as the stop outcome gets more severe. It 
is important to note, however, that for black drivers, the greater likelihood of being searched 
versus warned compared to white drivers does not carry over to arrests. In other words, the 
greater rate of searches experienced by black drivers does not also mean a greater rate of arrests 
for black drivers. This is not trivial because while black drivers are more likely to be targeted for 
suspected wrong doing as evidenced by their greater likelihood of being searched, they are not 
correspondingly more likely than whites to be found engaging in illegal activity resulting in an 
arrest. 
 There were significant, independent effects of driver race, sex and age on the likelihood 
of more serious stop outcomes. Net control factors, women drivers were significantly less likely 
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to be searched rather than warned and significantly less likely to be arrested rather than warned 
compared to men drivers. Net controls, black drivers were significantly more likely than white 
drivers to be ticketed and nearly 4 times more likely than white drivers to be searched rather than 
warned in a traffic stop. Hispanic and other race/ethnicity drivers were significantly more likely 
than white drivers to be cited rather warned. Older drivers were significantly less likely than 
younger drivers to be cited, searched and arrested compared to warned. 
  Focal Concerns and Stop Outcomes 
 Following a more complex theoretical model grounded in police focal concerns, 
hypothesis two predicts that race/ethnicity effects on stop outcomes will be mediated by 
measures of blameworthiness, dangerousness, and practical constraints. The findings reported in 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 show partial support for this hypothesis as well. Consistent with the second 
hypothesis, there were significant changes in the effects of driver race and sex on stop outcomes 
after accounting for focal concern measures. The strength of the effects of driver race and 
ethnicity was weakened for black drivers who reported being searched versus warned, 
particularly after accounting for driver demeanor and the length of the stop in minutes. The 
strength of driver race and ethnicity for minority drivers who reported being cited rather than 
warned, however, increased slightly after accounting for the reason for the stop, suggesting that 
black drivers' likelihood of being cited is conditioned by the reason they are stopped. 
Interestingly, black drivers became more likely than white drivers to be arrested rather than 
warned after accounting for the reason for the stop as well. This change was reversed, however, 
after accounting for demeanor, passengers, and number of prior contacts in subsequent models. 
This should not be surprising, given that driver demeanor had the strongest independent effect on 
the likelihood of experiencing a more serious stop outcome.  
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 Women's likelihood of being cited rather than warned compared to men also made an 
interesting shift after accounting for focal concern measures. In Model 2 for stop outcomes (see 
Table 5.4), before the inclusion of the first set of focal concern measures in the reason for the 
stop, women were not more or less likely than men to receive a citation rather than a warning. 
After accounting for the reason for the stop, and in each subsequent model after, women drivers 
were significantly less likely than men drivers to be cited versus warned. The strength of the 
effect for women drivers on searches and arrests versus warnings was weakened after the 
inclusion of focal concern measures, but significant difference remained. 
 Stops that last longer corresponded with greater likelihoods that the driver would be 
cited, searched, and arrested versus warned. It was hypothesized from a practical constraints 
perspective that the longer the stop lasts, the more time the officer has to gather more legally 
relevant information about the driver, and hence the effect of a driver's race should decrease. The 
strength of the effect race for minority drivers compared to white drivers did indeed decrease 
after accounting the length of the stop. There are alternative explanations, of course. The first, 
and perhaps simplest explanation, is that stops that result in more serious outcomes are likely 
going to last longer than stops that result in a simple warning or no other enforcement action to 
begin with. In other words, it takes longer, in most cases, to search and warn someone than it 
does to just warn them. This may not always be the case, but it is a reasonable assumption that 
the more serious the outcome, the longer the stop will last. 
 Second, there is anecdotal evidence that, when black and Hispanic drivers are stopped, 
they are sometimes stopped for much longer than white drivers (see Harris 1999) as a form of 
intimidation and informal punishment. I ran an ordinary least-squares regression analysis on 
length of stop (model not shown) for driver race, with the same control factors included in the 
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stop outcome models above, and the results confirm this relationship. Black and Hispanic drivers 
were significantly more likely to experience longer traffic stops than white drivers 
 Discretion and Pretext 
Hypothesis three addresses the question of driver race/ethnicity and officer discretion in 
initiating a traffic stop. Following a symbolic assailants/discriminatory perspective, hypothesis 
three predicts that racial and ethnic minority drivers will be more likely than white drivers to be 
stopped for a discretionary reason. The findings reported in Table 5.7 show some support for this 
hypothesis. The pretext argument in the literature suggests that minority drivers, particularly 
black and Hispanics, are stopped for discretionary reasons more than white drivers because racial 
stereotypes lead police to be more suspicious of them. My findings in the present analysis 
support this idea. Consistent with hypothesis three, black and Hispanic drivers were significantly 
more likely than white drivers to be stopped for a discretionary reason. Specifically, black and 
Hispanic drivers were roughly 1.8 and 1.5 times, respectively, more likely to be stopped for a 
discretionary reason compared to white drivers. For black drivers in particular, this finding may 
help explain why black drivers are more likely to be searched, but not arrested, versus warned. If 
they are being stopped more often for minor discretionary reasons in order for the police to 
search for other illegal activity, then search rates ought to be higher while the likelihood of 
finding illegal evidence leading to an arrest ought to be lower. This suggests that the police may 
cast a wider net for black drivers than for whites, basing stops and searches more on extralegal 
factors and less on legally relevant factors. 
  Focal Concerns, Symbolic Assailants and Racial Profiling 
 Focal concerns theory (Steffensmeier et al. 1998) has been used relatively successfully in 
the sentencing literature as an explanatory framework for judicial sentencing decisions, and has 
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recently been proposed as a potentially useful theory to explain racial profiling by the police 
(Tillyer and Hartley 2010). While there are clear distinctions between courtrooms and traffic 
stops, focal concerns propositions regarding the important factors affecting judicial decision 
making have applicability to the important factors affecting police decision making as well. The 
focal concerns approach to judicial decision-making recognizes the importance of legal factors 
embodied in notions of offender blameworthiness and dangerousness, such as seriousness of the 
crime. These considerations likely direct police decision making on patrol as well.  
 The last 50 years of policing research tells us that both legal and extralegal factors affect 
police enforcement decisions in police-citizen contacts (Ricksheim and Chermak 1993). 
Research on racial profiling in traffic stops, however, is still an emerging field. As such, the 
literature in this area is only beginning to explore theoretically grounded analysis of police 
decision making in vehicle stops. Theory is especially important in terms of distinguishing 
between the relative importance of different legal and extralegal factors, as well as in making 
sense of conflicting empirical evidence of racial disparities in stops and stop outcomes across 
disparate studies. A focal concerns approach (Steffensmeier et al. 1998), along with the notion of 
symbolic assailants in policing culture (Skolnik 1966), provide a plausible framework for 
helping to fill these gaps in racial profiling research. 
 While I can only indirectly infer about officer perceptions of racial minorities as 
symbolic assailants in these analyses, there is good reason to believe minority drivers are 
perceived differently than white drivers. The history of racism and discrimination in American 
culture, law and policies have left lasting legacies that continue to manifest in things like racial 
profiling today (Alexander 2010). Likewise, it is likely that the demographics of the U.S. 
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criminal justice system—arrest and prison population statistics in particular—contribute to 
persistent stereotypes about race, violence and crime (Massey 1993; Shelden 2007).  
 That said, traffic stops are a unique enforcement context, routine and mundane  compared 
to other policing contexts (Walker 2007). While the occasional traffic stop may rise above the 
level of routine infractions to more serious crime, most do not (Eith and Durose 2011). On the 
surface, this makes it difficult to imagine how racial disparities in other crimes could have any 
direct effect on disparities in traffic stops. On the other hand, given the very recent history of 
racial profiling policies in drug interdiction, for example, and the legacy of racial apartheid in the 
U.S. (Alexander 2010; Bonilla-Silva 2003), it is also plausible that the police continue to harbor 
conscious or unconscious racial bias towards racial minorities, particularly blacks and Hispanics 
(Jones-Brown 2007; Welch 2007). This bias, together with the highly discretionary nature of 
routine traffic enforcement—of which black and Hispanic drivers are more often the targets—
offers a compelling sociological context for the production of racial inequality in routine policing 
outcomes.  
 The widespread publication of crime measures exposes the public (and police) to the 
notion that minorities, particularly blacks and Hispanics, commit disproportionately more crime. 
These measures may also be used to inform organizational-level policy (Miller 2009) and 
individual-level expectations (Jones-Brown 2007; Smith and Alpert 2007) in police-citizen 
encounters. The police are, after all, in the business of generating official statistics. If the police 
believe, based on these measures, that blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be involved in 
criminal offending, from a crime control perspective it is plausible that the police would respond 
to these populations with greater scrutiny and perhaps more aggressive enforcement actions 
(Novak and Chamlin 2008; Petrocelli, Piquero and Smith 2003; Withrow 2006).  
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 The larger sociohistorical context of past and persistent divisions along lines of race, 
class and gender in the criminal justice system bears significance on the contemporary racial 
profiling issue in law enforcement (Georges-Abeiye 2001; Stokes 2007). Policing is undoubtedly 
shaped by legal concerns about crime control and safety, but so too by extralegal concerns 
stemming from the divisive effects of power and persistent social inequality. What this means is 
that policing traffic stops, like other policing crime, is a political activity. As Bernard Harcourt 
(2004) notes, "The great illusion is that all we are doing is fighting crime. That crime is out there, 
that we know what it is, that we simply go after it. This is the deepest fallacy. The fact is, we 
make crime." (375). The power to enforce and choose when and whom to enforce are coupled 
with perceptions of danger and culpability that are tied to broader social divisions of race, class 
and gender. 
 The focal concerns approach (Steffensmeier et al. 1998) is primarily in line with the 
crime control perspective which posits that officer decisions are motivated by legally relevant 
factors, citizen behavior and danger. The concept of symbolic assailants (Skolnick 1966) is 
primarily in line with the discriminatory perspective, which posits that racialized stereotypes of 
criminality and violence shape the police decision making process. While these two perspectives 
are distinct, I argue that, theoretically speaking, crime control concerns cannot be separated from 
preconceptions about race anymore than race can be separated from gender; legal factors are 
interpreted by the police through the lens of race (and class and gender), conflating extralegal 
factors with legally relevant ones. That said, more than half a decade of policing research has 
repeatedly found that legal factors (e.g., seriousness of the offense) are the strongest predictors of 
police behavior (see Smith and Visher 1981), and more recent racial profiling work has 
suggested that the influence of race and ethnicity diminishes when legal factors are considered 
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(see Fallik and Novak 2012). The essential question then is to what extent do racialized images 
and symbolic assailants influence police decision making in light of focal concerns of 
blameworthiness and danger? My findings support the notion that focal concerns of crime 
control and danger significantly shape stop outcomes and that these factors in general are 
stronger predictors of outcomes than race/ethnicity. At the same time, my analysis also found 
that driver's race and sex continued to shape stop outcomes in important ways, even when 
controlling numerous theoretical and control variables.  
 Good police work is sensitive to suspicious factors that give officers cause to investigate 
and, if necessary, make an arrest or administer other sanctions (e.g., warning or arrest). In this 
sense, it follows that focal concerns about blameworthiness and danger should matter the most in 
even in traffic enforcement. As mentioned above, however, it becomes problematic when 
perceptions of blameworthiness and danger are themselves shaped by racialized stereotypes of 
crime and violence. Many scholars have pointed to conflation of blacks and crime before 
(Alexander 2010; Bonilla-Silva 2003; Brunson and Miller 2006; Jones-Brown 2007; Peterson 
2012; Steen, Engen and Gainey 2005; Welch 2007). The cultural history of the United States is 
built upon ethnic notions (Riggs 1986) conflating race with dangerousness, violence, ignorance, 
drug use, and crime (Welch 2007). The cultural legacy of anti-black prejudice underlies 
contemporary racial inequality, both in and out of the criminal justice system (Alexander 2010; 
Skolnick 1995; Steen, Englen and Gainey 2005). In light of this literature, one would expect to 
see this conflation manifest in over-policing (e.g., excessive stops, arrests, searches, use of force) 
of black drivers, and particularly black men drivers, as a consequence of officers emphasizing 
extralegal suspicion driven by stereotype over legal suspicion driven by evidence (Jones-Brown 
2007; Warren, Tomaskovic-Devey, Smith, Zingraff and Mason 2006). 
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 The Gender of Racial Profiling 
 The intersectionality of race and sex remains an under analyzed area in racial profiling 
research. To explore the effects of intersectionality on traffic stop outcomes, I combined data on 
driver race and sex and duplicated the statistical models for stop and stop outcome hypotheses 
with these new interaction terms. There are several important patterns that arise in the data after 
accounting for the intersectionality of driver race and sex.  For example, while women are 
consistently found in the literature to experience less serious stop outcomes than men (Harcourt 
2007), even when accounting for situational/legal and environmental factors (Engel and Calnon 
2004; Lundman 2004), my analysis found that this is mostly true for one group of women: white 
women. Black and Hispanic women's traffic stop experiences are closer to those of white men 
than they are of white women, with the exception of citations—in fact, black and Hispanic 
women are significantly more likely than white men to receive citations. Likewise, black drivers 
are found in much of the literature to be disproportionately searched compared to white drivers 
(Lundman 2003; Harcourt 2004; Withrow 2006; Engel and Calnon 2004). I found similar 
patterns on the independent effects of race/ethnicity as well. However, after accounting for the 
intersection of race and sex, it is black men who account for most of the difference in searches 
between black drivers and white drivers. 
 In the models that measured race and sex separately, some of the biggest stop outcome 
disparities existed between white drivers and black drivers. When combining data on driver race 
and sex, another pattern develops. Among white drivers, only white women were significantly 
more likely than white men to receive a warning as opposed to a ticket and/or arrest. Black and 
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Hispanic women's likelihood of receiving a warning versus a citation and/or arrest were 
comparable to white men's and did not experience the gendered benefit that white women did. 
 These findings suggest that we cannot make sense of racial disparities in traffic stops 
without also considering sex and gender. Race and gender are linked in important ways and 
significantly shape meaning of racial disparities in traffic stops. While there were very clear 
distinctions in terms of men's and women's traffic stop experiences, as well as between white 
drivers' and black and Hispanic drivers' experiences, alone these distinctions obscure how racial 
profiling is gendered and racialized simultaneously.  
 Study Limitations 
 While the use of self-report citizen data provides many benefits over police-reported data 
on traffic stops and stop outcomes, there are several limitations as well. The shortcomings of 
PPCS data have been enumerated before. Engel and Calnon (2004) outline several of these 
limitations. First, there are "theoretically relevant variables" that are not included in the PPCS (p. 
67). For example, there are no measures of citizen income in the 2008 PPCS, no data on the 
condition of the driver's vehicle when stopped, only general estimates of community context,  
and no indication of what type of police agency the officer worked for (e.g., municipal, county, 
state). Furthermore, as discussed above, the temporal order in which a traffic stop unfolds is not 
captured well by the PPCS. For example, there is no way to know if a driver who reported being 
arrested and also reported arguing/threatening the police was arrested before or after they 
argued/threatened the officer. 
 Second, respondents to the PPCS report their own race and ethnicity. This is contrary to 
most police-collected traffic stop data—which typically involves an officer recording the driver's 
race and ethnicity on a traffic stop report as the officer perceives them. While race and ethnicity 
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data based on officer perceptions are likely more susceptible to racial/ethnic identification errors 
than self-reported race and ethnicity, officer perceptions of race are an essential aspect of racial 
profiling analysis. In other words, if there is discrepancy between what race/ethnicity a driver 
identifies as on the survey and the racial/ethnic category the officer perceives them to be, then 
what matters the most in terms of racial profiling? Because officer decision making is the 
primary dependent variable, officer perceptions are key. It is not clear if or how discrepancies of 
this sort may or may affect the findings, but there is no clear or practical way to resolve this 
limitation with PPCS data. 
 Third, the community context in which a traffic stop encounter occurs is only vaguely 
specified via the size of place measure where respondents live and whether they were residents 
where they were stopped. Likewise, PPCS data do not indicate any other community measures 
that would be of interest, including the racial make-up of the area where a stop took place, 
whether the stop occurred in a residential versus commercial area or the socioeconomic 
conditions of the community in which the stop occurred, for example.  
 Fourth, as a supplement to the NCVS, PPCS data "have many of the same potentially 
problematic methodological issues as the NCVS" (Engel and Calnon 2004:67-68). The overall 
validity and reliability of self-report data is problematic if responses are systematically biased 
(Engel and Calnon 2004:68). If one group's patterns in responses to certain questions of interest 
are different than another group's, survey validity may be notably hindered. Smith, Tomaskovic-
Devey, Mason, Zingraff, Chambers, and Warren (2000) found that among drivers who had 
received traffic citations, black drivers were less likely to acknowledge the citation compared to 
white respondents in a follow-up, self-report survey.  It is unknown if underreporting occurred in 
PPCS data similar to that found in Smith et al.'s study in North Carolina. However, if black 
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respondents systematically underreport citations, arrests, or searches, then disparities reported in 
this analysis are conservative estimates of the study's hypotheses. On the other hand, if black 
respondents underreport illicit activity (e.g. being found with illegal weapons or drugs), then the 
validity of analyses on hit rates becomes questionable (Engel and Calnon 2004). 
 Summary 
The influence of citizen's race on police decision making in police-citizen encounters is 
one of the most controversial and long-standing debates in policing research. The racial profiling 
controversy of the 1990s reinvigorated this debate in a new context: the traffic stop. Research on 
traffic stops, race and police decision making has since grown rapidly. Empirical evidence 
stemming from this recent attention has been mixed with little theoretical direction, however.  
The study of racial profiling has evolved over the last two decades. Early research sought 
to document and measure for racial disparity in the distribution of traffic stops. Research then 
moved from police decisions to initiate the stop to police decisions to investigate (e.g., search) 
and resolve the stop (e.g., warn, cite, arrest) after it is initiated. The most salient research 
questions in this body of work ask whether racial minorities, particularly black and Hispanic 
drivers, are more severely punished and subject to more suspicion of wrongdoing than whites in 
traffic stops. Most of this work has operationalized punishment and suspicion by the objective 
stop outcome/enforcement action taken by the police, including decisions to warn, cite, search, 
arrest and use force. As a whole, this body of work has produced mixed results. Much early work 
showed significant racial disparities in stops and certain stop outcomes, but more recent work 
has challenged these findings by criticizing the profiling literature for a number of shortcomings, 
including a lack of clear theoretical specification, limited sets of independent factors, and a lack 
of sophisticated multivariate analytical techniques (Delisi 2011).  
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My findings point to the importance of both race/ethnicity and key focal concerns of the 
police in understanding patterns in traffic stop outcomes. The strength of the effect of 
race/ethnicity on stop outcomes was weakened by accounting for measures of driver 
blameworthiness, dangerousness, and practical constraints relevant to policing vehicle stops. 
This weakening was not an erasure, however, as driver race/ethnicity remained significant, 
particularly for black men who are searched (but not arrested) versus warned.  
Furthermore, the intersectionality of driver race/ethnicity and sex highlights the limits of 
examining the role of race independently from sex and gender in racial profiling analysis. My 
intersectional analysis shows that analyzing sex independently from race masks the true nature of 
racial differences in traffic stops and stop outcome. While women consistently experienced less 
serious outcomes than men, this was predominantly true for white women and not for black, 
Hispanic, and women of other races. 
Routine traffic stops have important implications for race, class and gender inequality in 
society. The focal concern and control factors included in these analyses appear to mediate at 
least some of the race/ethnicity effects on stop outcomes. Gender and sex, too, shapes the 
landscape of racial disparities in traffic stops. Alone the distinctions in traffic stop experiences 
between men and women, as well as between whites and racial/ethnic minorities, obscure the 
gendering of racial profiling. Future work should continue to theorize the intersectionality of race 
and gender (and class) in routine traffic enforcement.  
Future work should also continue to develop theoretical models and data collection 
instruments (quantitative and qualitative) that can account for more precise estimates of relevant 
variables and more explicitly address the debate between crime control and discrimination 
perspectives in policing. The disparate implications of the crime control and discriminatory 
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perspectives have caused sharp divides in the political, social and academic discourse 
surrounding racial profiling (Harcourt 2004). At the same time, the propositions stemming from 
these two perspectives have remained largely implicit in much of the empirical work. Focal 
concerns and symbolic assailant concepts show promise as theoretical frameworks that can 
produce useful analyses of police decision making and serve to help address the divide between 
crime control and discriminatory understandings of racial inequality in policing. 
  Routine police stops are a gateway to the criminal justice system and a tool of social 
control. The implication of widespread racial profiling is a system where enduring racial 
tensions, fears, panics, and stereotypes are both learned and perpetuated. This potential makes it 
imperative that future research works to better understand the interconnectedness of race, gender 
and policing practices. 
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